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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF TIIE QUINTESSENTIAL 
BEST CASE FOR COMPENSATION 
The "takings" question continues to bedevil land-use regulation. 
Waving the banner of liberty are the property rights advocates, who 
point to the Fifth Amendment's requirement that government not "take" 
property without ''.just compensation," and to the expansive interpretation 
of rights that has won the field in other areas of constitutional jurispru-
dence. Allied are the wealth-maximizers, who argue that unpredictable 
land use regulations decrease incentives for productive market activities. 
Counterpoised are the defenders of government intervention, who argue 
eloquently that, without restrictions, private misuse of land threatens our 
environment, our health and safety, and our historic heritage. 
Federal courts, not surprisingly, have struggled through the tangle of 
the takings issue. As with most difficult questions, the courts have clung 
to a "balancing method" ("test'' would be too strong a term): If the law 
seems to serve a worthwhile cause and does not affect private property 
too harshly, it is upheld;1 if the public benefits seem dubious and the 
private landowner stands to lose a large amount of money, the law is 
struck down or compensation required.2 While workable, this system 
provides little guidance for government, for private citizens, or for trial 
I. See, e.g., Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
(restriction on construction for historic preservation purposes was not a taking); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition of using property to manufacture alcohol 
was not a taking). 
2. See. e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) 
(prohibition on waterfront construction that denied owner of all value in property was 
a taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (conditioning a 
building permit on the transfer of an easement was a taking). 
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court judges. The dividing line at the edge of private property rights is 
not only fuzzy, it is nonexistent. Indeed, it is probably impossible to 
craft a test that "solves" the takings question either to the satisfaction of 
any side or through any settled logical legal analysis. 
Summary of the Quintessential Best Case. This Article does not offer 
a sharp dividing line between regulations for which compensation is 
required and those for which it is not. Rather, it suggests a method of 
identifying the "quintessential best case" for compensating landowners' 
monetary loss caused by land-use regulation. Thus, this Article seeks to 
establish a logical analysis for identifying the categories of cases with 
the strongest argument for compensation. The focus is not on the goal 
of welfare maximization, which has been addressed more thoroughly 
elsewhere. Such a focus does not appear to lend itself toward identify-
ing a hierarchy of cases of compensation, which is this Article's goal. 
Rather, because of the unique nature of the right to takings compensa-
tion, the Article focuses on the fundamental logic of propriety, or 
fairness, which lets some economic concepts in through the back door. 
In brief, the "quintessential best case" is this: The best case for 
compensating a landowner whose property value is diminished by a land 
use regulation is that in which--
1. The adverse effects of the regulation are imposed on a small 
number of landowners. 
2. The benefits of the regulation are distributed widely in favor of the 
relevant community. 
3. The landowner appears to be relatively "innocent," in that the 
regulation appears to be a fairly arbitrary government effort to further 
the public welfare, as opposed to an effort to stem a harm that is 
inherent in the regulated land use. 
The elements of the quintessential best case are justified, in brief, as 
follows: 
l. When regulations are imposed on a small group of landowners, 
concerns of unequal treatment (but not necessarily "equal protection'') 
are most likely to be implicated-government has treated similarly 
situated persons differently because of ease of administration or other 
factors outside the control of the affected landowners. 
, 2. When the benefits of the regulation are widely distributed among 
the community, the benefits work in favor of the persons who pay for 
the costs of compensation---i.e., the taxpayer. This fit can open the door 
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to employing the political process to engage the community in land use 
decisionmaking. 
3. When a landowner makes out a case of "innocence,'' which it is 
more likely to be able to do with ad hoc land-use regulations than with 
business regulations, the argument for passing along the costs of the 
regulation to the entire community through compensation and taxation 
is strongest. 
The quintessential best case is further justified by showing that it 
avoids covering the sorts of regulations that trigger the strongest 
arguments against takings compensation-namely, that the regulation is 
merely refereeing land-use disputes or that it would be fiscally unfeasible 
for government to provide compensation.3 Moreover, the quintessential 
best case encompasses the types of regulations that generate some 
powerful arguments in favor of compensation, such as the encourage-
ment of better governmental decisionmaking and the development of 
public awareness of local environmental issues. Democratization of 
land-use decisions could play a powerful role in developing 
communities' consciousness of land use problems and concems----an 
achievement that would be worth more to the environmental movement 
than any number of legislative victories. 
Which sorts of regulations are likely to fit within the definition of the 
quintessential best case? Good candidates are specific site regulations, 
such as historic preservation and adverse zoning changes, which 
typically are imposed on one or a few landowners, distribute benefits 
,videly, and sometimes implicate a sense of unequal treatment of similar 
parties.4 By contrast, poor candidates for the quintessential best case 
are ecologically based rules, which typically are imposed widely and 
implicate the doctrines of nuisance or interconnections of land.5 
A philosophy of compensation-either jurisprudential or regulato-
ry-that is shaped around the quintessential best case set forth here 
would not necessarily generate an increase in compensation for takings. 
Rather, employment of the quintessential best case would enable courts 
3. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (noting impossibility 
of government to provide compensation for every adverse change in property values due 
to government activity); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (requirement that 
plaintiffs cut down their cedar trees in order to protect apple trees was not a taldng); 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (discussing the role of government in 
protecting the "fragile" aspects of ecosystems). 
4. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (restriction on construction upon historic 
building); Hadacheck v. Sebastien, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (rezoning of specific sites). 
5. For examples of ecologically based regulations, consider the governments' 
arguments in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), and in 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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and regulators to follow shared ideas of propriety, help improve the 
choices made in regulation, and aid the effectiveness of government 
efforts to regulate land for the public and the natural good. 
I. SOME COMMENTS ON THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
COMPENSATION FOR GOVERNMENT TAKING 
It is not the purpose here to reiterate the history of the takings debate 
or to provide anything like a complete iteration of the competing 
philosophical stances.6 As a refresher, however, the following summary 
is provided, with particular emphasis on points that will be useful in 
identifying the quintessential best case. 
A. The Constitutional Requirement and its Historical Background 
Amendment Five of the United States Constitution, after proclaiming 
various rights of the criminally accused and the right not to be deprived 
of!ife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, states: "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."7 
Out of this statement has arisen the takings dile=a. 
In old English co=on law, private property rights was a risky 
proposition; prerogatives of the crown typically came first. Indeed, 
before the Magna Carta, the idea of private real property was subordi-
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (the leading work setting forth the argument that 
government's uncompensated regulation of private activity discourages and diminishes 
valued private economic activity, thus leading to a decrease in total wealth, the lodestar 
of the law and economics school); FRED BOSSELMAN Er AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1973) 
(commissioned by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, this is a good summary 
of the history of the takings issue through the early days of the liberal environmental 
movement, with particular strength in both the English common-law reasoning behind 
the takings clause and the case for letting government act unfettered by compensation 
concerns). 
Id. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The full text provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy oflife or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
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nated, at least in theory, to the entitlement of the crown, for whom 
property was held, similar to the concept of a trust. The Magna Carta 
proclaimed that, "No freeman shall be ... deprived of his freehold ... 
unless by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land."8 
Nonetheless, until the nineteenth century, or at least until the intellectual 
revolution that spawned Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776, 
governments imposed a variety of land-use regulations, both in Britain 
and in the American colonies. Because land was considered the life-
blood of economic well-being-at least before the industrial revolution 
and Marxism offered machines and the proletariat as vanguards of 
wealth creation-governments were keen on protecting one landowner 
from harm by another landowner's use of land.9 Restrictions minimiz-
ing the two overwhelming and constant threats to eighteenth century 
towns--------fire and pestilence---were typical. 10 Today's minimal-compen-
sation advocates often rejoice in recounting the depth and intricacy of 
eighteenth century land-use regulation.11 
What commentators do not always recognize is that most of these 
eighteenth century regulations would be viewed today as falling within 
the doctrine of nuisance; and even property-rights advocates accept a 
role for government intervention in preventing harm to land or person 
by virtue of another's misuse of one person's land.12 Nonetheless, a 
strong undercurrent of today's property rights movement is the belief 
that the regulations imposed by today's governments are of a different 
kind than those adopted before the era of progressive government. A 
8. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 56 (quoting the MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39); 
see id., at 53-81, for a summary of the English history. 
9. See id. at 53-81. 
I 0. See id. at 82-105. 
11. Id. 
12. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the 
Supreme Court held that a regulation which purportedly made valuable seaside land 
completely worthless violated the takings clause if the regulation did not fall within the 
state's traditional law of nuisance. Although Lucas raised as many questions as it 
answered, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court lends support to the idea that nuisance 
alone is the dividing line between regulations that require compensation and those that 
do not. Id. at 1029. Environmental advocates see this as a cramped and closed-minded 
conception of environmental protection. See generally Louise A. Halper, Why the 
Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329 (1995). 
Indeed, a legal realist might point out that before the democratization of American and 
British government in the nineteenth century, governments would not likely impose 
regulations that harmed the wealthy, landowning, voting, and ruling class. It would be 
one thing to impose laws restricting the building of flammable huts in certain parts of 
town or limiting the health hazards created by small slaughterhouses; it would have been 
another thing to tty to prevent a wealthy landowner from filling in marshlands, in order 
to protect local birds, or to prevent him from replacing his historic 200-year-old mansion 
with a more up-to-date model. 
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mainstream eighteenth century legislator might have voted for a law that 
limited the slaughter of birds or fish if shown that the local stock of 
edible animals was being seriously threatened; he would never, however, 
have voted for such a law because of a belief in the rights of nature or 
a belief that "plants and animals are also people, and ... are given a 
place and a voice in the political discussions of the humans."13 
Likewise, the eighteenth century legislator might have restricted the 
blocking of creeks that imperiled farms downstream, but would not 
restrict coastal development for the sake of wilderness preservation, an 
idea that would never have occurred to him, and if such an idea had 
been suggested, he probably would have considered it preposterous.14 
It is this undercurrent, this conception of history and expanding 
government, that compels property rights advocates to rely on the 
pedigreed doctrine of nuisance as a guide to takings issues.15 
With the boom in economic capitalism in Britain in the eighteenth 
century naturally came a heightened emphasis on private property rights. 
William Blackstone, whose Commentaries were completed only seven 
years before The Wealth of Nations, stated: "The third absolute right, 
inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists in the 
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without control 
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."16 The forward-
thinking Blackstone's immense popularity in forward-thinking America 
has been cited as a reason for the taking provision's appearance in the 
Fifth Amendment, and provisions of a similar nature were part of 
colonial and early statutes before the Constitutional Convention of 
1787. 17 In the federal constitution, Blackstone's qualification "save 
only by the laws of the land," has disappeared. 
What were tbe founders thinking about when they enshrined the 
Takings Clause at the end of tbe Fifth Amendment? Like most 
provisions in the original constitution, evidence is scanty and, where it 
13. Gary Snyder, Energy is Eternal Delight, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1973, at 43. 
14. Cf PETER MARsHALL, NATURE'S WEB: RETIIINKING OUR PLACE ON EARTH 
102-03, 296, 370, 405 (1992) (discussing the lack of concern for ecology, wilderness, 
or nature for nature's sake in European/American thought until well into the nineteenth 
century). 
15. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1004, 1032. 
16. WU.LIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARJES 109-10 (Robert Malcolm Kerr ed. 
1876). 
17. See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 92-99 (citing laws of Pennsylvania, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts). 
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exists, is mixed. 18 Nonetheless, it appears likely that the drafters were 
prompted by the emphasis on private party rights emphasized by 
Blackstone, as well as concerns over government's potential physical 
seizures of land in times of crisis, such as wartime.19 There is no 
indication that any drafters thought that regulations not involving 
physical intrusions ofland, such as simple restrictions on the use ofland, 
were "takings." 
Many supporters' enthusiasm for government regulation is no doubt 
dampened by the obvious implications of applying "original intent" to 
other constitutional questions, such as those regarding the First 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the protections of the 
criminally accused under the other clauses of the Fifth Amendment. 20 
On the other side, many private property rights advocates no doubt 
hesitate to employ theories that empower courts to reach far and wide to 
protect non-property hum;m ''rights."21 Thus, we find Justice Scalia 
leading a property rights majority in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council22 and adopting an expansion of rights against government 
regulation, but failing to rely on any rights-advocacy scholarly support 
of the past 60 years. 23 
18. Indeed, current philosophies from both the right and left question the premise 
of the •~ntent'' undertaking-that we can divine what a body of representatives, who may 
have been motivated by different factors at different times and whose ideas may have 
changed from day to day, ''meant" by a certain combination of words. Consider Justice 
Scalia.'s exhortation to ignore legislative materials in trying to interpret statutes, and 
William Eskridge's study of the problem of interpreting statutes. Scalia tells judges, in 
essence, to follows the words of the statute. See. e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 453-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). Eskridge, however, calls on judges, 
in essence, to interpret the statute in order to create a result that is fair. See WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
19. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 6, at 103-04. An original draft of the Fifth 
Amendment referred to the requirement of '~ust compensation" in instances when a 
person was to "relinquish bis property, where it may be necessary for public use." 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (Joseph Gales ed. 1789); BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 
99. 
20. See, e.g .. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
21. One argument is that the appropriate method of securing rights is not simply 
to apply the dictiomuy meaning of written words or the uncertain intent of now-dead 
drafters, but to interpret the right in a manner so that the effect of government action 
does not infringe on the interests apparently implicated in the right The most influential 
discussion of rights tbeoryis in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
23. This reversal of principles parallels the debate over another "right-of-center" 
right, that of arms ownership under the Second Amendment 
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B. Mugler and the Balancing of the Public Interest 
While the nineteenth century was the century of private property, it 
was not the age of a vigorous application of the Takings Clause. The 
reason was a dearth of such government intervention to begin with,24 
but this began to change with the application to the states of most of the 
Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, through incorporation by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The most noted case is Mug/er v. 
Kansas,25 in which a brewer complained of Kansas's adoption of a 
prohibition on the sale of alcohol. Needless to say, the prohibition 
devastated the brewery business. The Supreme Court, through Justice 
Harlan, held that no compensable taking occurred, in part because the 
prohibition law was a valid exercise of the government's police power 
and because the government did not physically invade the plaintiff's 
land.26 Had the case gone the other way, things would have been quite 
interesting for the Sixteenth Amendment (national prohibition) and 
criminal laws banning marijuana sales in the 1920s and LSD in the 
1960s. Mug/er memorialized some important concepts for the takings 
analysis: 1) that criminalization of land use appears to automatically 
disqualify the landowner from asserting a taking; 2) that regulation for 
"police power" concerns, such as health and safety, defeat a taking 
assertion; and 3) that regulation of a use that is "prejudicial to the public 
interests," is different from regulation that is "appropriation of property 
for the public benefit."27 However, twentieth-century commentators 
24. A number of cases did make it to the reporters in the nineteenth century, and 
they resemble the twentieth century cases in their conclusory decisions and failure to 
develop any coherent method for deciding taking cases. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition of using property to manufacture alcohol was not a taking); 
Purnpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-81 (1871) (flooding was a compensable 
taking). 
25. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
26. Id. at 667-68. 
27. Id. at 668-69. Justice Harlan's opinion in Mug/er also implied that a 
compensable talcing may occur only when the government action is done ~'without due 
process of law." 123 U.S. at 669. Such an implication takes the "due process" 
limitation against deprivations of life, liberty, or property, from the preceding clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, and carries it down to the final takings clause. Such a reading 
might indeed be consistent with the original intent of the Takings Clause, if one 
concludes that the drafters were l'rimarily concerned with ad hoc government seizures 
of property that might occur durmg wartime or other emergencies, and not with duly 
adopted laws or regulations. The problem with such an implication is that it is not 
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have forcefully challenged each of these three principles, and it is not 
difficult to imagine scenarios in which each of these principles breaks 
down. 
Especially troublesome is the concept that regulations restricting land 
use for the "public interest'' are fundamentally different from regulations 
seizing land for the "public benefit." The apparent distinction-that if 
government is simply telling another not to use land in a certain way, 
there is no taking, but when government actually uses the land itself or 
passes along use to the public, there is a taking-becomes very fuzzy at 
its edges. Consider, for example, a ordinance stating that a landowner 
cannot build on its property in the middle of a congested town, and that 
the expressed rationale for the regulation is to provide a sorely desired 
vista, fresh breezes, and a sense of open space for neighboring towns-
people. Is this simply a restriction on use of land for the "public 
interest'' or is it a use of private property for ''public benefit" (such that 
in effect, the landowner would argue, the government has seized the 
private property from the ground up and "given" it to the neighboring 
townspeople)? This is not an easy question to answer, and these sorts 
of questions are the dilemma of the takings issue in the twentieth century 
and likely into the twenty-first century as well. 
Mugler also implicitly supports the idea, which has held fairly well 
through the current century, that the "property'' to which the Takings 
Clause refers is most likely to be real property--land-and not personal 
property, such as a horse or furniture, or business property, such as a 
factory. Why this is true is not intrinsically obvious. Indeed, the 
Republican proposal during the 104th Congress to codify a broad 
compensation scheme for private-property regulation would have 
included non-land-use regulations.28 The 104th Congress' failure to 
enact a broad compensation scheme might just have been because of the 
breadth of the proposal; compensating forest owners for federal 
restrictions on Jogging old-growth forest might have passed by itself, but 
it was weighed down by a requirement that could have had the 
supported by the text of the Fifth Amendment, which is plainly devoid of a "due 
process" element The takings clause plainly does not state that compensation is 
required only when the government action is done "without due process of law." 
Moreover, to conclude that no "due process" takings of property require compensation 
would subordinate private property entirely to the whim of government. Even seizures 
of land for purposes of eminent domain, such as the classic case of government seizure 
of property for public road construction, would not trigger any constitutional ground for 
compensation. 
28. See, e.g., Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 203 
(1995); see also Tom Kenworthy, GOP Plan to Broaden Property Rights Could Cost 
Public Dearly, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1994, at A7. 
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gove=ent compensate factory owners even for labor regulations.29 
Some answers to the land and non-land distinction are proposed in Part 
II of this Article. Suffice to say here, however, that regulations of land 
use are much more likely to attract a close takings scrutiny than 
regulations of other private "property." 
C. Powell and the Problem of Government Purpose 
On the heels of Mugler, but perhaps even more instructive, is ''the 
oleomargarine case," Powell v. Pennsylvania.30 There, Justice Harlan 
and the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the "takings" claim of 
oleomargarine manufacturers, whose product in Pennsylvania, like the 
brewers' in Kansas, had been outlawed as dangerous to the health of the 
state's citizens. But Powell provides an important lesson in coming to 
terms with the takings issue: the potential abuse of regulation. Today 
it seems obvious that the purported health dangers of oleomargarine, 
resulting in the enactment of numerous criminal laws in dairy-producing 
states, was essentially a sham spurred by the dairy industry, which feared 
the competition from ersatz butter. The insights of the "public choice" 
school of legal scholarship has heightened awareness of the potential 
abuse latent in the police power to enact sham protection for certain 
industries.31 Examples of these sort are not uncommon, as anyone who 
has tried to explain the restrictions on admission to the legal bar can 
testify. Such protectionist regulations would seem to be prime 
candidates for some sort of judicial intervention. Ironically, however, 
the role for application of the Takings Clause may be broader, despite 
all its ambiguities, than the role for scrutinizing economic regulation 
under the toothless "rational basis" equal protection test.32 Should the 
fecklessness of the equal protection scrutiny of economic regulation 
encourage courts to adopt, through takings claims, a sharper lookout for 
29. H.R. 9 § 203. 
30. 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
31. See, e.g.. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GoRDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT 283-95 (1962). 
32. It was one of those arguably sham public-welfare or industry-protection laws 
that stands as the most prominent example of federal courts' bowing out of scrutinizing 
economic regulation. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding 
an Oklahoma law prohibiting opticians from fitting old glasses into new frames or 
providing duplicate lenses, to the obvious benefit of wealthy aod well-connected 
optometrists aod opthamologists). 
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sham regulations? To date, there seems to be little judicial support for 
such a role. The threshold problem is that the burden on compensation 
would fall not on the beneficiaries of such regulations-the protected 
industries----but on the public.33 Perhaps appropriately, there seems 
little impetus to use takings scrutiny to ferret out sham public wel-
fare/protectionist regulations. 
D. Pennsylvania Coal and the Idea of "Going Too Far" 
After Mugler and Powell came the Progressive era of activist 
government and the countervailing reaction in the courts, typified by the 
decision of Lochner v. New York,34 which struck down as unconstitu-
tional a state law restricting how a business could be run. Although 
Justice Holmes issued a notable dissent in Lochner, in which he chided 
that the Constitution did not enshrine laissez faire economic theories, it 
was Holmes who wrote the most significant takings opinion of the early 
twentieth century: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.35 Here was an odd 
case: In the anthracite coal region of Pennsylvania, many householders 
purchased property from coal companies, subject to the companies' 
retaining the right to mine under the ground, thus risking subsidence of 
the property and waiving any claim for property damage due to 
subsidence. In response to the problem of cave-ins, Pennsylvania 
adopted a law forbidding any mining that caused a cave-in of occupied 
dwellings-making it difficult if not impossible for many coal compa-
nies to take advantage of the mineral rights they had retained. Mahon 
purchased property subject to such right to mine, the Pennsylvania Coal 
Company started mining, the ground gave way, Mahon sued to enjoin 
the mining, and the company charged that the Pennsylvania law "took" 
their property without compensation. Holmes and the Court agreed with 
the coal company that the regulation was a taking requiring compensa-
tion, stating in memorable language the general: "[W]hile property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
33. The taxpayer would suffer a double-whammy, first by legislators who deprive 
them of useful services or products in order to protect the wallets of well-connected 
industries. and second, by courts seeking to recompense aggrieved industries (and their 
employees). 
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
35. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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recognized as a taking."36 The "goes too far'' language has become the 
symbol for the difficulties inherent in developing a sound takings test. 
Pennsylvania Coal remains the starting point for the modem takings 
debate, although Holmes' ruling has not always held the day.37 
Advocates of a narrow role for compensation typically argue that while 
physical invasions of property require compensation, regulations that do 
not involve an invasion or seizure do not trigger compensation. 38 Is it 
clear that Pennsylvania Coal, the object of much scorn over the years, 
did not concern a physical seizure? What about the waiver the coal 
company retained, which the Pennsylvania law essentially abolished?'° 
If a regulation declared invalid a right to an easement over neighboring 
property, would this be a physical seizure? If the easement was the right 
to cross one neighbor's land and regulation forbade taking advantage of 
the easement, it is difficult to see how such a regulation would not be 
a physical invasion. 
36. Id. at 415. Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that all the legislature bad done 
was to enact routine "police power" legislation, by preventing coal companies from using 
their property in a manner harmful to others. Id. at 422. If the case had not involved the 
coal company's retaining of mineral rights, Brandeis would undeniably be correct; under 
centuries-old nuisance law, one landowner cannot use his land so as to cause hann, such 
as subsidence, on another's land. This is a tort of the most basic kind. However, in 
Pennsylvania the coal companies thought they had purchased from people like Mahon 
the right to cause subsidence, by virtue of the waiver of the right to sue, which 
presumably decreased the sale price of the property. A response in favor of the Mahons 
might have been that the breadth of the coal company's land ownership in Eastern 
Pennsylvania at the time made bargaining difficult or impossible for individuals. Today, 
we might expect that homeowners like Mahon could get insurance against the coal 
company's decision to exercise its mineral.rights-after all, 34 years elapsed between 
the sale of the property subject to mineral rights and waiver and the coal company's 
decision to mine. 
31. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendectis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) 
(upholding a Pennsylvania law similar to the act at issue in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal, 
primarily on the ground that the modem legislature had developed a better record of the 
"public interests" for the legislation). 
38. See, e.g., the narrow observations of the "ordinary observer'' in BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-19, 100-03 (1977). 
39. Progressive government actions that could be construed as vio1ating contracts 
made between private parties, such as in Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
were on unsteady ground in the early twentieth century. Pennsylvania Coal could have 
been decided on the ground that the Pennsylvania law violated the constitutional right 
to enforce contracts. 
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E. Miller v. Schoene and the Interconnection of Land 
With the expansion of government since the days of Pennsylvania 
Coal, landowners, emboldened by Holmes's promise that non-invasion 
regulations may be a taking if they "go too far," have pressed the 
Takings Clause in many contexts. The sum of the decisions can be 
characterized best as fulfilling Holmes' analysis: It's a taking if the 
regulation goes too far, and not a taking if it doesn't. This is not much 
guidance. Three cases in three widely disparate areas will highlight the 
current dilemma. First, in Miller v. Schoene,4° the Supreme Court 
upheld Virginia's order that owners of certain red cedar trees had to 
destroy these trees in order to stop infection of commercially significant 
apple tress nearby. The conclusion that "[i]t would have been none the 
less a choice'"1 to accept the status quo--at the apple trees' ex-
pense--is a starting point for the modem, interactive viewpoint of 
private property relations. This perception's significance cannot be 
overstated. Concluding that the acceptance of the non-regulatory status 
quo is a government "choice" in itself opens up a tremendous new 
intellectual realm for judicial scrutiny of the status quo as being the 
result of a government choice.42 
For the takings issue, however, Miller v. Schoene can also be seen as 
an example of government's enforcing the right against nuisance-the 
old tort doctrine that one cannot use one's land in a manner that 
interferes with another's use or enjoyment ofland. Because the creator 
of the nuisance is considered to be infringing on another's rights to use 
his own land, no compensation is required for regulations restricting 
nuisances.43 Because of the potential power of nuisance law-through 
which a plaintiff can get damages and an injunction-to restrict a valued 
activity if it affects a less valuable neighboring activity, courts retained 
the right to balance the competing interests. Permitting government to 
referee these inherent disputes of interconnected land uses, \vithout 
having to pay compensation that presupposes the outcome of the 
refereeing, lies at the heart of Miller v. Schoene and its progeny. 
Unlike nineteenth century's small landowners, who largely failed in 
their efforts to stop industry-created nuisances because of industries' 
40. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
41. Id. at 279. 
42. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District Bd. l, Denver Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) 
( concluding, in essence, that de facto school segregation alone is enough to amount to 
violation of equal protection). 
43. For a good discussion of the law of nuisance, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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political power, twentieth century environmental-protection advocates 
have educated government as to the interconnection of land use. 
Building upon John Muir's observation that "[w]hen we try pick out 
anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the uni-
verse,',.. these advocates argue that conceiving of property as involving 
sharp boundaries, with invisible walls that government cannot cross 
without "taking," is extremely naive.45 For protection of nature and the 
environment, advocates have trumpeted the idea of "ecology''--the 
relationship of natural forces to one another.46 While a landowner 
might view filling his one acre wetland as a matter purely of his own 
concern, an ecologist points out the potential effect of the filling, 
combined with similar actions, on birds and fishes, maintenance of water 
tables, filtering pollution, flood control, and perhaps even the protection 
of weather patterns. An economist, as opposed to an ecologist,47 might 
point out that the lesson of Miller v. Schoene is that the law fails to 
assign to property any rights implicated by interconnection. Did the 
cedar tree owners hold the right to infect the apple trees, or did the apple 
tree owners hold the right to keep the "cedar rust'' away from their apple 
trees? In its most rudimentary state, nuisance law clings to a boundary 
conception of property--if one uses her land to step over the boundary 
in any way, she is guilty of a committing a nuisance. By accepting a 
balancing test, however, nuisance law recognized that a strict boundary 
conception could lead to some absurd results-it would be unfair to 
outlaw the entire city of Manchester, England, because of the smoke 
44. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER 1N TIIE SIERRA 110 (1908). For a more 
modem statement from the middle of the road, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032-36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing the fragility and interconnection of ecosystems). 
45. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale 
L.J. 149 (1971). 
46. Coined by Geanan biologist Ernst Haeckel in the nineteenth century, the ideas 
of ecology were first widely disseminated in America by George Perkins Marsh, 
primarily through Man and Nature, published in 1864. Marsh focused on the unintended 
effects of humans on the physical environment. See PlnLIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN 
FIRE 55-59 (1993). As Marsh was a rough contempora,:y of Karl Marx, private property 
advocates might well have written that "a spectre is haunting private property-the 
spectre of ecology." KARL MARx, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO I (1848). 
47. The prefix ueco," which because of"ecology" has come to mean things having 
to do with nature, actually derives from the Greek word meaning "house.n The word 
"economics" meant management of a house, while ecology meant the study of the 
workings of the house. 
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nuisance that wafts on farmer Brown's property. An economist might 
also point out that, regardless of the decision of law, we might expect 
the private parties to negotiate among themselves to achieve the most 
economically efficient uses of the land.48 
F. Penn Central and Question of Public Rights 
Regardless of economic theories of wealth maximization, it is the legal 
rule that determines who will end up richer and who may end up 
bankrupt. Consider the second of our three modern cases, Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City,49 in which the Supreme Court 
upheld New York's historic preservation laws, which restricted Penn 
Central from building a fifty-five-story office tower on top of famed old 
Grand Central Station.50 Relying on the fact that New York's historic 
preservation rules were part of a comprehensive "program," and the fact 
that Penn Central could continue to use the terminal in the same manner 
that it bad for sixty-five years, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
uncompensated restriction on the landowner's use of air rights was not 
a "taking." 
48. Economists have made an interesting observation about these sorts of undefined 
property disputes: Because of the ability of private parties to bargain, we should expect 
the most "efficient't resu]t to occur, no matter how property is initially assigned. This 
is the Coase Theorem. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1-44 
(1960); see TODD G. BUCHHOLZ, NEW IDEAS FROM DEAD ECONOMISTS 189-90 (1989). 
In Miller v. Schoene, for example, if the government had done nothing, one might have 
expected that the apple owners would have paid the cedar tree owners to remove the 
cedar trees; had the cedar trees been more valuable to their owners, the owners could 
have purchased from the apple tree owners the right to keep them, even with the 
Virginia law. 
49. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
50. That the Penn Central plan became the leading historic preservation decision 
is fitting; New York's, and indeed the nation's, emphasis on historic preservation was 
spurred by the destruction of the even more famous Penn Station in New York in I 964, 
which galvanized historic preservationists the way that the damming of Yosemite's 
Hetch Hetchy Valley in 1913 galvanized the wilderness conservation movement. See 
SHABECOFF, supra note 46, at 73-74 (Hetch Hetchy); ADA LOUISE HUXTABLE, GOODBYE 
HISTORY, HELLO HAMBURGER 47-54 (1986) (Penn Station). Madison Square Garden 
was built on the site of the demolished Penn Station building. Penn Station was the 
Pennsylvania Railroad's terminus in Manhatlan; Grand Central was the Grand Central 
Railroad's. When the two old rivals fell on bard times in the 1960s, they merged to 
form the ill-fated Penn Central. By that time, Grand Central had already sold the air 
rights to the back half of its terminus for construction of the colossal Pan Am Building 
(now the MetLife Building), completed in 1963. Altering the fantous vista down Park 
Avenue, the Pan Am Building has been called "the epitome of irresponsible planning and 
design." PAUL GoLDBERGER, THE CITY OBSERVED: NEW YORK 127 (1979). The 
planned Penn Central tower would have marred the great concourse room of the 
tenninal. Probably for reasons greater than the Supreme Court's decision, Penn Central 
went bankrupt in I 970--the greatest bankruptcy in American history at the time, 
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Penn Central highlights some new elements in the talcing analysis. It 
is one thing to conclude that government may regulate things that affect 
others' use of property, as in Pennsylvania Coal or Miller v. Schoene, 
the railroad argued; it is another thing entirely for government to restrict 
the people's use of land simply because the government wants to do so, 
without attaching the desire to any property right. New York City did 
not say that the office tower could not be built because a state would 
have restricted light and air from reaching the street-as it did earlier in 
the century by adopting set-back construction requirements-mid it did 
not do so because of the danger of objects falling from the building and 
hurting people and damaging property. This was not a case of nuisance 
or interconnective use of land. One doubts that any New Yorkers 
believed they held the "right'' to continue to see an unaltered Grand 
Central as they commuted to work each day. The historic preservation 
rules were adopted simply because the city government wanted--and 
presumably a fair number of citizens wanted----Grand Central to remain 
as it was, a fine example of Beaux-Arts architecture, use of urban space, 
and a symbol of New York City's glory (much faded by the 1970s). 
These are all fine reasons, but why, the railroad argued, should Penn 
Central have to bear the costs of giving up something it thought it 
owned-the air rights over the building-so that the city could continue 
to enjoy the architecture of Grand Central? Nearly every other 
landowner in mid-town Manhattan had taken advantage of its air rights 
by the 1970s, so why should Penn Central have to lose an asset simply 
because it, unlike others, had the initiative to commission a great work 
of architecture in 1913? Unlike most other taking cases, the city wasn't 
preventing Penn Central from building something (it was not the office 
building per se that was prohibited), but from altering something that 
Penn Central already built and used; this might be, from some libertarian 
perspectives, a significant difference. Penn Central highlights the 
argument that just because a regulation may serve the public interest-as 
all eminent domain cases presumably do--it does not mean that the 
adversely affected landowner does not deserve compensation. 
Despite these arguments, Penn Central was not a good case for 
challenging anti-development laws, because the railroad's office plan 
was, in effect, trying to take advantage of "property" that the railroad 
had not really seemed to "own" before. Presumably, the railroad bought 
the land at one time for the purpose of building a railroad terminal, 
which it did, and which purpose remained unaffected by historic 
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preservation. For decades the railroad-a profit-maximizing company, 
one assumes-----seemed content to use the land as a rail terminal and 
nothing else. Only in the 1970s, when rail travel was of diminished 
importance and huge office buildings of greater importance, it appears, 
that someone had the bright idea of taking advantage of the air rights 
over the terminal. It was, in a way, as if the railroad "found" an asset 
it did not have before and New York City simply was preventing the 
-company from taking advantage of the newly found property. A 
distinction is made between out-of-wallet losses, on one side, and the 
loss of a chance to increase the size of the wallet, on the other. 51 In 
takings jurisprudence, the factor of losing what one thought one had is 
called diminishment of "investment-backed expectations."52 
G. Lucas, the Nuisance Doctrine, and the Bundle of Rights 
This leads to the third of our modem trio of exemplars, Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council.53 Lucas paid nearly a million dollars for 
some coastal property, in hopes of building beachfront homes. 54 Soon 
thereafter, the state enacted a statute that prevented construction within 
a certain distance from the shore, ostensibly because of erosion 
concems.55 Because Penn Central and other opinions had based their 
"not taking" conclusions largely on the fact that the landowner still could 
make some profitable use of the land, Lucas tried and succeeded in 
getting the trial court to rule that the regulation eliminated any value for 
the property whatsoever.56 Taking this cue, Justice Scalia aod the 
Supreme Court set forth in Lucas the principle that when a regulation 
eliminates completely the monetary value of a property, even without a 
physical invasion, the regulation is likely to be a taking. While a victory 
5 l. Under the principle of diminishing marginal value of income, a loss of X 
dollars that one already holds always "hurts" more than a loss of a chance to gain X 
dollars that one does not have. Thus, a typical person will not agree to risk $ 1000 on 
the toss ofa coin, even if she is promised $1001 if the flip goes her way. 
52. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
54. For a further explication of the south Atlantic waterfront, see JOHN MCPHEE, 
ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCIIDRUID 77-150 (1971). 
55. Was preventing harm to other South Carolinians and expense to the 
government caused by houses being swept away the true impetus for the government's 
action? Or, was this an environmental variant of the oleomargarine case: environmen~ 
talists wanting the shoreline to remain natural and conjuring up a marginal or nonexistent 
risk as a statutory basis? One of the frustrating aspects of legal decisionmaking in 
complicated matters like this is the inability of the litigation system to resolve such 
crucial questions. 
56. Because of skepticism over the trial court's finding that the land was 
monetarily worthless, Justice Souter wrote that he would dismiss the writ of certiorari. 
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1076. 
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for the property rights movement, it is not likely many landowners will 
be able to take advantage of thls principle. Such a value-destroying 
regulation could survive without compensation, Lucas held, only if the 
regulation could be justified by traditional nuisance law. On remand, 
South Carolina settled the case. 
Lucas highlights both the argument of "investment-backed expecta-
tions" and, in more up-to-date parlance, the "bundle of rights." First, 
when a non-invasion regulation has caused a large and distinct unexpect-
ed out-of-pocket monetary loss to the landowner, the argument goes, the 
landowner should be compensated. Lucas seemed to fit this bill just 
right-the developer spent nearly a million dollars for the property on 
the expectation of building houses. The regulation seemed to cost Lucas 
his entire million dollars, plain, simple, and direct. Moreover, the right 
to property is not simply the right to gain access to it, goes the theory 
underlying Lucas, but the right to gain access to the "bundle of rights" 
that naturally come with property rights ownership, such as using the 
land to make a profit in many different ways.57 Only if the landowner 
did not possess the right within his bundl~uch as the case with 
creating a nuisance, which, because of the pre-existing doctrine, was by 
definition not in the bundle to begin with-may gove=ent interfere 
without compensation, the Court held.58 Gove=ent's taking away 
any of the strands in the bundle is a taking of property.59 
57. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (referring to the "bundle of property 
rights" theory). However, in Andrus, the Court reasoned that "destruction of one 'strand' 
of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Jd. 
at 66. One might have thought that if someone has a bundle of coins and someone else 
removes one coin, the bundle owner would rightly think that his coin has been ''taken," 
even though the bundle is still there. 
58. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
59. There are many critics of the "bundle of rights" theoiy. For one thing, there 
are all sorts of semi-certain restrictions on property use that have been traditionally 
imposed and accepted even by proper()' rights advocates, including restrictions on 
criminal activity, such as the growing or manufacture of illegal drugs, and the doctrine 
of nuisance. These restrictions are not seen as 'laking•t a natural right, but as the law's 
clarification of what rights one has. This conception might lead to the philosophy that 
rights are simply those things that government says one bas. Under such a theo-
ry-which shows impatience with notions of natural rights to propert)<-the struggle 
shifts entirely to the political arena, where rights, property, wealth, and happiness are 
fought over, won and lost Legal rights become simply political rights. See Frank I. 
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REY. 1097, 1112-13 
(1981). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1984) (focus of 
judicial scrutiny should not be on specific substantive outcomes, but on ensuring 
211 
Some economic analysts maintain that this rogue power of government 
skews the productive forces of the market, takes away valuable effort put 
into business decisions, and discourages useful investments. The result 
is diminished wealth for our nation. By seeking to redistribute the fruits 
of the American economy, the argument goes, government decreases the 
size of the entire pie. 60 As noted above, this argument has been stated 
more forcefully and eloquently elsewhere, most notably in Richard 
Epstein's book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain.61 
Advocates of government authority are more skeptical of the supposed 
devastation that land use regulations supposedly wreak on productive 
investors. Speculative businessmen such as Lucas take risk all the time, 
they point out, and no one compensates them for an array of losses that 
may be beyond their control--such as through changes in the market, 
economic downturns, and changes in demand.62 Moreover, when 
government unexpectedly profits business, as by putting in a new 
highway or building a military base that causes demand for local 
business to soar, no one expects that the lucky investors should disgorge 
their profits; why should the opposite be true? Costly land-use 
regulations are just one of those things, like the costly benefits to 
employees that all employers now pay, that should be viewed as simply 
a risk of business in the modern age. Capitalism will survive. Indeed, 
a little study into erosion could have saved Lucas a lot of trouble. As 
land-use regulation for ecological reasons becomes more common, fewer 
investors will be able to claim that the regulations are unexpected. And 
ifregulations are such· potential time-bombs keeping investors awake at 
night, why doesn't anyone sell takings insurance? 
procedural access to representation of various interested groups). In this fully politicized 
world, as the argument plays out, it is silly to worry that wealthy aod well-connected 
landowners wiH not get their "fair'' share in the long run. They always have, and there 
is no reason to assume that they will not continue to do so, despite the occasional 
stumble of someone like Lucas. · 
60. Bruce Ackennao has suggested that the intricate economic aoalyses can be 
contrasted with the conclusions of the "ordinary observer." ACKERMAN, supra note 38, 
at 15-19, 100-03. The ordinary observer apparently considers the dividing line to be 
whether a physical invasion has occurred. This observer, however, may suffer from 
Northeastern myopia. It is not clear that an "ordinary observer'' sitting in a barstool in 
an Idaho mill town would consider environmentally driven government restrictions on 
land use-What good is land, if not for "use"?--to be anything else than a 11taking11 of 
private property. 
61. EPSTEIN, supra note 6. 
62. For a discussion of the possibility of private insurance to cover government 
regulatory takings, see Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for 
Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 572 (1984). 
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Finally, in response to the increase-the-pie point, this is the same 
argument that has two sides in so many areas of law and policy: 
Advocates of intervention in the market maintain that the distribution of 
slices of the pie is just as important, if not more important, as the size 
of the pie to begin with.63 These advocates also argue that the referees 
in this dispute are the political branches; there is no reason for the 
judiciary to override the procedurally valid judgments of government. 
Moreover, in the fields of the environment and human welfare, some 
thing&--the vigor of forests battling against acid rain, the peace imparted 
by a beach uncluttered by condominiums, and the sense of community 
shored up by retaining an old downtown against suburban strip 
malls--are not so easily fit into the market, or the "pie" of wealth. 
· Hogwash, rejoin the economists, people can and do place these values 
within the market all the time. With regulation, however, certain well-
connected groups use the coercive power of government to impose their 
desires and preferences on others, and force market-responding 
landowners to foot the bill. 
And so, the takings debate rolls on, with no solution in sight. The 
property rights advocates' "bundle of rights" theory would, taken to the 
logical extreme, eliminate any room for government to coerce private 
conduct without compensation, unless through a time-honored doctrine 
such as nuisance. On the other side, government rights advocates' 
emphasis on the interconnection of land and the meaninglessness of 
boundaries would, taken to the extreme, undermine compensation even 
when government physically "invades" land. The 104th Congress, 
emboldened by an anti-government spirit, promised to reign in uncom-
pensated taking by regulation, but then failed to do so, in large part due 
to the general public-relations failures of the second wave of the 
"Contract With America. "64 One cannot predict the future, but the 
takings dilemma will continue to occupy and frustrate government, 
litigants, and courts for years to come. 
63. Compare, e.g .. Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL Snm. 191 
(1980) with RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374-77 (1990). 
64. See G. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LA w iii-iv 
(1996 Supp.). 
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II. WHY LAND REGULATION Is DIFFERENT AND THE FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAW WITH A BALANCING APPROACH 
The Constitution prohibits taking "property" for public use without 
compensation. Since the days of Mug/er, it is plain that the "property" 
right granted by the Constitution is essentially a real property right, and 
not the putative right to run the "property'' of one's affairs or one's 
business in the manner one wishes. Suits challenging work safety rules, 
or laws banning the possession of drugs, are unlikely to proceed far 
under a takings theory. Why is this so? Why should the Constitution 
or the courts be more concerned about uncompensated land-use 
regulation than about uncompensated business-activity regulation? 
There could be many responses to this question. There is the 
historically special significance of land to a landowner's well-being, 
which made land "real" property. 65 Another expression is that 
Americans' "homes are their castles." Indeed, in the United States, the 
sense of physical property is so strong that even temporary searches and 
or seizures may not be accomplished without probable cause.66 
This Article proposes two other reasons for differentiating land use 
regulation. Because of the peculiarities of land and its regulation, 
adversely affected landowners may hold relatively stronger arguments (1) 
that they are being treated differently from similarly situated persons, or 
(2) that the perceived problem giving rise to the regulation is something 
fully outside of their control. These two attribute&---the first, which this 
Article calls the ''unequal treatment" argument, and the second, the 
"happenstance" argument-are more likely to occur with land-use 
regulation than with regulation of business activities, as argued below. 
Moreover, these two arguments are likely to form the basis of any 
landowner's argument of "innocence" that is the third element of a 
quintessential best case. 
The "Unequal Treatment" Argument. Land is unique in that it cannot 
be moved. It is also unusual in that it cannot be created, in most 
circumstances. While there may be innumerable actors in a commercial 
market, or at least innumerable potential actors, a critical plot of land 
cannot easily be shifted or replaced. If eucalyptus groves are felled, no 
economic arguments about substitutes and pricing can aid the koala. 
And if a shopping mall replaces an Indian War battlefield, no amount of 
65. As recently as the eighteenth centwy, more than four of five people in the 
world "lived from the land and from nothing else." FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE 
STRUCTIJRES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 49 (Sian Reynolds ed. & trans. 1981). 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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marketing can regain what has been lost. Indeed, when land and the use 
thereof was the chief source of wealth creation, scarcity of land in the 
face of a growing population was the source of much economic 
lament.67 
Because of the scarcity and immobility of land, land-use regulation is 
more susceptible to being especially burdensome to the affected 
landowner than is non-land-use regulation. The weight of these costs 
may lead to the argument that the landowner is receiving . "unequal 
treatment"--that one or a few landowners are bearing an unfair share of 
the burden of public benefit. 
Consider a typical regulation of business, say, one that aims to protect 
the worker vis-a-vis the company by imposing occupational safety 
standards. While the company may complain of the burden of the new 
regulations, the business at least is assured that its competitors-at least 
in the jurisdiction adopting the regulation-are similarly burdened. No 
company gains an inherent advantage. Similarly, if the government 
restricts the content of chemical additives placed in beverages, all drink 
manufacturers can find solace in the fact that their rivals are similarly 
constrained. Business adjusts to the new regulatory climate.68 
By contrast, a land-use regulation typically affects only a certain set 
of otherwise similar landowners. Consider a town whose government 
concludes that it has become too big and too crowded: The roads are 
clogged, and its highway is a sea of strip malls. Accordingly, the next 
time a developer proposes a new major commercial development on 
commercially zoned property it has purchased, the town government 
prevents construction of the development by rezoning the area or 
refusing to grant a building permit-a fairly common scenario for 
governments skeptical of "growth." The developer does not merely 
67. Consider the fears of the early nineteenth century economists such as reflected 
in THOMAS RoBERT MALTIIUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 139-40 
(1909). 
68. Of course, non~land-use regulation can and sometimes does extend as far as 
prohibiting an industry altogether. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The 
brewery in Mug/er no doubt suffered irrecoverable losses in that machinery, plants, and 
training were rendered worthless. While alcohol prohibition measures were doubtless 
seen as containing a large element of moral content, as do today's anti-narcotic laws, 
government sometimes compensates persons for burdens imposed for regulating conduct 
considered at least partly "immoral." Consider the California proposal to purchase old, 
gas guzzling vehicles from their owners, instead of outlawing them or restricting their 
use. See Pulling a Clinton on CAFE, Detroit News, Oct 1, 1992, at IOA. 
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readjust with his competitors to new rules; the developer incurs a 
significant out-of-pocket loss (and employees hired to work in the 
prospective stores may lose their jobs). Other developers are unaffected, 
simply because they developed first. The new commercial developer 
complains that the town's desire to limit congestion is fulfilled by 
restrictions on it alone, even though all the commercial establishments 
in the town are equally to "blame." The new development would not 
create any more traffic or visual blight than any of the other developers 
already in place. Why should last in time be last in right?69 
Or consider a row of business on Main Street, each of which seeks to 
install uniform red signs and awnings on their street front-alterations 
which have proven to attract business. The town government permits 
the alterations, save for one business, whose facade the town declares to 
be an historic example of the 1940s art moderne. The regulated business 
suffers in comparison to its otherwise similar neighbors. The historic 
building owner may fairly complain that the town's benefit in preserving 
the old edifice should not be imposed on the owner of the building, 
especially since his competitor down the street, who occupies a non-
historic building, has now gained an advantage over him by the 
government restriction. 
The distinction between the burdens imposed by the hypothetical 
business regulations and land-use regulations discussed above is, of 
course, that the burden of the land-use regulation is more likely to fall 
on one or a few of similarly situated parties. 70 Indeed, it has long been 
established in zoning law that land-use regulations affecting only one or 
a few landowners must be treated as adjudications, not simply regula-
tions, thus triggering a variety of quasi-judicial protections for adversely 
affected landowners, including the rights to be heard, to present 
evidence, and to examine witnesses.71 These special protections 
afforded to landowners are a recognition of the unique burdens and 
potential appearance of unequal treatment that may be engendered by 
land-use regulations. 
Can land-use regulations be tailored to minimize the apparent unequal 
treatment? Probably not, in many cases. Because the complaints and 
69. Indeed, restrictions that essentially permit pre-existing land use to prosper, 
while restricting new development, might disproportionately affect women and ethnic 
minorities, for whom the opportunities to build and develop were sorely diminished 
historically. 
70. For an argument advocating a greater response to the varying financial effects 
of regulation, both positive and negative, see DONALD G. HAGMAN, WINDFALLS FOR 
WIPEOl.TIS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978). 
71. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of Comm'rs, 507 P.2d (Ore. 1973); Hyson v. 
Montgomery County Council, 217 A.2d 578 (Md. 1977). 
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costs-not to mention the takings claims-of forcing closure of existing 
businesses are not something that most gove=ents are willing to face, 
anti-congestion restrictions are likely to be imposed only on future 
growth plans. Because investment in land is less fungible than 
investment in other resources, gove=ents are less likely to order 
existing businesses off their land than they are to order existing 
businesses to conduct their affairs in a different manner. And in the case 
of the historic building, it is by definition unique.72 Moreover, because 
land use regulation is likely to be imposed on only one or few parties, 
the sheer monetary affect of the regulation is likely to be substantial, felt 
immediately, and not susceptible to being passed along as the cost of 
business. ' 
The susceptibility of land-use regulations to unequal treatment 
underlies much of the complaint about the supposed unfairness of land-
use regulation. Although the potential role of unequal treatment in the 
takings issue has been noted before,73 the concern is not that the 
regulation may be constitutionally infirm under the equal protection 
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. Land-use regulations typically 
will not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's standard.74 Since the 
1930s, the courts essentially have abdicated any role for equal protection 
analysis in simple economic regulation not implicating racial, gender, or 
ethnic concems.75 Indeed, one of the primary reasons for the courts' 
72. A good example of a land-use taking case that did not involve specific plots 
of land but applied broadly was Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419 (1982), in which a New York Jaw required that landowners permit cable 
television operators to install cable mechanisms on their property. Nonetheless, because 
the law involved a physical invasion, it was held unconstitutional. Id. at 438. 
13. See generally Sax, supra note 45. 
74. Should not concerns of unequal treatment fall within, and only within, the 
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? No. A growing body 
of logical philosophy argues that Western thought, which assumes that each element 
must fit within one and only one category, inaccurately reflects the state of the world. 
Scientific thinkers have coined the term "fuzzy logic" to refer to logic, stemming from 
Eastern and Buddhist thought, that emphasizes the aspect of a number of categories 
inherent within the single element. The critical job is identifying the degree of each 
category within the element, not shoe-horning an element entirely into one box or 
another. See generally BART KOSKO, Fuzzy TlllNK!NG (1993). For constitutional 
analyses, the implication of fuzzy logic would be to recognize that concerns of unequal 
treatment may underlie rights other than the Fourteenth Amendment, albeit less 
prominently. 
15. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (the court's 
furthest foray in recent years, but still firmly grounded in the idea of the Equal 
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reluctance to enter into the regulatory fray is the realization that 
weighing the benefits and drawbacks of economic regulation is best 
made by the political branches, not by courts. 
The Takings Clause, however, has a different type of remedial focus 
from the Equal Protection Clause. The equal protection analysis requires 
a court to balance the good supposedly engendered by the regulation 
against the harm-with the result being that the regulation is either 
upheld or struck down. Under the takings analysis, the issue typically 
is not whether the regulatory action itself is something that government 
may do constitutionally, but whether the regulation, the constitutionality 
of which is assumed, triggers compensation to adversely affected parties. 
Accordingly, consideration of the good engendered by the regulation 
need not play such a prominent role in the decision whether the right is 
implicated. 
For example, when asked to scrutinize under equal protection a law 
that imposes especially harsh criminal penalties on the use of a certain 
type of narcotic, the court considers whether the law is constitutional, 
which in effect involves weighing the benefits of the law against the 
inequality produced by it. On one side, the special social and economic 
problems with the narcotic will be emphasized by the government, along 
with expressions of disinterest in the empirical observation that certain 
ethnic groups might be predominantly affected. On the defendant's side, 
the distinctions between this narcotic and other drugs will be minimized 
and the disparate effect on ethnic classes will be accentuated. In 
essence, the court is asked to reconsider the wisdom of the regulation, 
with the special considerations of the race-gender-ethnicity issue of equal 
protection now in the equation. 
The analysis of a takings issue, by contrast, does not, or should not, 
proceed this way. The constitutionality of the government's adopting a 
regulation with compensation typically is assumed. The issue is whether 
the regulation triggers compensation. 
The "Happenstance" Argument. Awareness of the interconnection of 
land use, particularly in furthering environmental and ecological 
concerns, is a fairly recent phenomenon. While concepts of erosion, 
stream pollution, and other simple processes have long been understood, 
more complex mechanisms, such as water tables, the chemical effects of 
pollution, and the over-arching influence of habitat loss in explaining 
Protection Clause as protecting groups of persons with immutable personal characteris-
tics). 
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species decline are concepts still working their way into the public and 
legal consciousness.76 
Because of the complexity and relative newness of many environmen-
tal concerns, landowners may in certain instances make out fairly strong 
cases that the need for regulation was pure "happenstance," for which 
they are in a sense innocent. A most prominent example is the 
Endangered Species Act.77 The discovery of habitats of little-known 
endangered species can stop even the biggest and most expensive 
plans.78 While economists would rightly point out that rules of law 
should encourage landowners to do their own inspection for endangered 
species effect before creating development plans, it is not difficult to 
imagine situations in which a landowner's argument of innocence-that 
the discovery of the sf ecies was an unforeseeable "happen-
stance"-would be strong. 7 Such cases of innocent happenstance will 
occur with more frequency in the complex world ofland-use regulation 
than in the realm of business regulation. 
The Fundamental Flaw with a Balancing Test. Recognition of the 
"equal treatment" argument and the "happenstance" argument exposes 
the fundamental flaw in adopting a balancing test to the takings inquiry. 
The takings inquiry should not focus on the importance of the regulation 
as much as on the merits of compensation. 
76. See Sax, supra note 45; SHABECOFF, supra note 46. Critics of Western 
thinking explain that the European mind-set has sought to categorize evecything into self-
contained balls that may be shaped, exploited, and disposed of, in order to serve the 
"productive" end of wealth creation. This categorization, while effective for short-tenn 
exploitation, fails to capture the links, visible or not, of structures such as natural 
habitats. From this narrow expectation of land arises an impatience in transforming and 
shaping land. With immediate wealth creation the lodestar, there is no inclination to 
hesitate before burning off grama grass to plant corn, stifling fires in order to protect ripe 
timber, or filling in a wetland to build a housing development-each of which may cause 
serious ecological damages in all but the shortest term. See MARSHALL, supra note 14, 
at 97-126, 168-93. 
Just as it took decades for American courts to swallow the notion that government 
might regulate the internal affairs of a business in relation to its employees without 
violating concepts of natural rights, it may take decades for new perceptions of land use 
to overcome the American presumption that land boundaries are inviolate, and that what 
one does with one,s land is of no concern to those across the fence. 
77. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
78. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (snail darter 
stops a dam). 
19. See CHARLES MANN & MARK PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE 4-27 (1995) (story 
of the discovery of endangered burrowing beetles that stopped an Oklahoma road 
planned to assist poor American Indians). 
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A constitutional rights test that focuses nearly exclusively on the 
merits of a "right" is a rare bird in constitutional jurisprudence.80 Even 
witb such close-to-tbe-core rights as the First Amendment's rights to free 
speech and free exercise of religion, there are exceptions for interests 
such as time, place, and manner of speech, for emergency situations such 
as tbe proverbial crowded !beater, and for otber supposedly urgent policy 
concerns, such as restricting narcotics use. 81 These exceptions exist 
because creating absolute rights would be too much; often they clash 
with paramount government desires. In such cases, even First Amend-
ment rights must give way. 
There is no such clash with tbe takings issue. Because in most cases 
the regulation may continue in force even if compensation is ordered, the 
level of importance of tbe regulation need have little effect on whether 
compensation is warranted.82 Indeed, tbe greater tbe benefits of tbe 
regulation, the more willing government and tbe citizenry will be willing 
to pay compensation. 
For example, if a town desires to build a road through private 
property, it does not matter whether tbe road is important or not; 
compensation plainly is warranted. 83 Similarly, regulations tbat impose 
few burdens on a private party are less likely to warrant compensation, 
80. Most of the reasons for compensation have already been identified-the text 
of the Constitution, the sense of sanctity of property in the Anglo-American tradition, 
the economic stimulus created by the certainty of being able to reap the monetary 
rewards of investments, the sense of unequal treatment in land.use regulations, and the 
facilitation of political ability to distinguish between regulations that are good for the 
country and those that are not 
81. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (upholding peyote criminalization). 
82. As explained below, the quintessential best case does not ignore the 
government's reasons for the regulation. Certain sorts of regulations, such as those that 
referee disputes over interconnected land uses, make very weak cases for compensation, 
for example. The nature of the regulation may play a key role in identifying cases 
justifying compensation. What is argued here, however, is that the question whether the 
regulation is of a high or low level of importance (Is this an especially valuable 
regulation or not?) should make little difference, per se, in deciding whether compensa· 
tion is justified. 
83. The usual rule that physical invasions require compensation does not 
necessarily correlate with a significant harm to the landowner. Consider, for example, 
a case in which the government desired to build a small satellite tracking station ( or 
spotting station for sandhill cranes) on a remote acre of all-but-abandoned privately 
owned grassland in eastern Wyoming. Assume that the monetary value of the acre is 
minimal, that the land bad not been visited by its owners in years, and that the 
importance of the satellite station ( or crane station) is significant. Even though 
compensation here might appear to be more trouble than it is worth, compensation would 
still be expected under current law, because of the bright line rule in favor of 
compensation for physical invasions. Bright line rules have their merit, most prominent 
of which is ease of application. 
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regardless of whether the benefits to government are large or not. 
Regulations should be scrutinized primarily on the justification for 
compensation and the monetary costs thereof, not on the level of 
importance of the regulation. 
Consider the parallel in the development of tort law concerning 
compensation for accidents. Tort law resembles takings law in that it is 
equitable---it typically does not prohibit conduct but merely provides a 
mechanism for compensation. In the 1940s, Learned Hand addressed the 
question of how and whether businesses should be liable for injuries 
caused by the lack of safety precautions. 84 Hand reasoned that if the 
expected cost of not taking the precaution (that is, the costs of the injury 
multiplied by the likelihood that the injury would occur) exceeded the 
expense to the company of taking the precaution, the company should 
have taken the precaution and thus should pay tort damages. If, 
however, the expected costs of not taking precautions were less than the 
expense of the precautions, the company was deemed to have acted 
reasonably in not taking the precautions and was not liable for injuries 
caused by the lack of the safety measures. 
While the Hand test appeared on its face to be a simple and elegant 
way of maximizing the use of resources, its shortcoming soon became 
apparent. First, persons badly injured by dangerous practices found 
themselves unable to recover a penny, as long as the business could 
show that precautions were too expensive. The Hand test was shown to 
be too static in terms of its analysis of business behavior; under the 
expected costs versus expense test, a company had no incentive to seek 
out or develop cheaper techniques of avoiding injuries. The company 
also had no incentive to rearrange its operations to avoid dangerous 
operations altogether, which was the idea behind even pre-industrial 
strict liability law.85 Indeed, as a matter of risk-spreading and fairness, 
it was thought that better policy would be to impose the costs of injuries 
on the company rather than the injured party. Finally, the difficulties of 
assessing the probabilities of injuries and the expense of talcing 
precautions proved a litigation nightmare for courts and litigants. In the 
84. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
85. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (strict liability 
for "non-natural" uses); REsTA'IEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965) (even if not 
negligent, a party employing an abnormally dangerous activity may be liable for injuries, 
in order to discourage use of such dangerous activities and encourage development of 
safety measures). 
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1970s, Guido Calabresi proposed a way out of the Hand morass: the 
"cheapest cost avoider" strict liability theory.86 Much simplified, this 
strict liability test in effect would impose on a business all the costs of 
physical injuries caused by its product and activities. For precautions 
that did not pay for themselves, the business would continue to act in its 
financial interest, but pay tort judgments along the way. Under this 
system, businesses would be constantly on the look-out for safer 
products and less accident-prone operations.87 Such internalizing of 
costs and benefits, it is argued, creates the best incentive for finding the 
best mix of safety and risk in society. 88 
While some of the rationale for the "cheapest cost avoider" may 
diverge from the takings analysis, the fundamental lesson is valid-just 
because action may be more important and more significant than the 
costs imposed does not mean that compensation is not warranted. 
Creating a system of regulation will encourage the actor to seek out the 
least costly method of conducting its affairs or achieving its goals, even 
if those methods are not readily foreseeable ex ante from any particular 
point in time. While compensation requires an assessment of the costs 
of injury, this one-party assessment may often be easier to administer 
than a two-party balancing of costs against benefits. Finally, compensa-
tion spreads the risks and may end up imposing the costs widely on 
those persons-consumers or taxpayers---who are the true beneficiaries 
of the product or action. 
Before completing this section, a cautionary note: The analysis set 
forth here is not to imply that constitutional takings compensation should 
be as broad as that proposed for tort law under strict liability. Such a 
rule would be nonsense. Unlike private actors in the commercial world, 
governments typically do not act for profit motive but, ostensibly, for the 
public interest. If a manufacturer creates a toy that generates more costs 
86. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
87. While this conception has not been adopted explicitly by state courts, the 
common assumption among tort lawyers is that our system bas come to resemble, in 
some ways, a system of strict liability, in which juries are reluctant to send innocent 
injured parties home without any compensation from the large wealthy company whose 
good or service caused the injury. See, e.g., Susan Okie, What Wins Malpractice 
Cases?, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1997, at Health 7 (citing a study concluding that liability 
in medical malpractice cases depends primarily on the level of injury, not on whether 
medical care was negligent). We acquiesce to a system of semi-strict liability in 
practice, if not in law. 
88. Indeed, even when a business would be made to swallow expensive tort 
judgments, it could in many instances pass along these "costs0 of production to the 
conswners of the business's goods or services. Consumers' choices play an essential 
role in choosing the production of the goods and services that serve human desires in the 
most efficient manner. 
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in injuries than the consuming public is willing to pay for, the toy will 
not be made, and we are the better for it. For many government land-
use regulations-such as sorting out competing property uses that 
implicate nuisance, restricting habitat destruction in order to foster 
endangered species, or zoning a neighborhood against industrial 
use---there are forceful, cogent arguments against any sort of compensa-
tion, arguments that do not have to do with the value of the regulation. 
The point of this exercise has been to emphasize that compensation 
decisions should be made by reference to the justification for and 
drawbacks of compensation qua compensation, and not by weighing the 
merits and burdens of specific land-use regulations. 
ill. DEFINING THE QUINTESSENTIAL BEST CASE FOR LAND-USE 
REGULATIONS THAT WARRANT COMPENSATION 
Having summarized some of the essential problems of the takings 
debate, located the centrality of the unequal treatment concerns in land-
use regulation, and criticized the traditional balancing test, it is time to 
set forth more specifically the proposal for the "quintessential best case" 
for land-use regulations that do not involve physical invasion, but 
nonetheless warrant compensation paid to adversely affected landowners. 
These elements are: 
I. The Regulation Narrowly Targets a Small Group of Landowners 
As explained above, when land-use regulations impose costs on only 
one or a few landowners, they may generate a sense of unequal 
treatment among landowners. 89 While this concern typically will not 
fit within the narrow scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause, the sense of unequal treatment--that the burdens of 
regulations are being distributed sharply on a few landowners, even 
though they are situated similarly to others-may warrant compensation. 
All of the public benefit may be counterpoised on the shoulders of only 
a few of the landowners whose conduct necessitates the regulation. As 
explained above, land-use regulations are more likely, because of the 
scarcity of land and its lack of fungibility, to raise these unequal 
treatment concerns than other commercial or economic regulations. 
Moreover, land-use regulations are more likely to impose momentous 
out-of-pocket losses on a landowner, who may not be able to pass the 
89. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75. 
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burdens along to consumers or workers, as might a business subject to 
commercial or employment regulation. The likelihood of a substantial 
loss of "investment-backed expectations" is greater with land-use 
regulations than with other regulations, and is greater with land-use 
regulations that burden only a few landowners. Some examples of these 
principles are explained in Part V. 
Finally, when a land-use regulation imposes costs on only a few 
landowners, there is an increased likelihood that the regulation is 
actually a form of economic protectionism-a sham "public benefit" 
regulation. While courts have essentially closed shop in an effort to 
ferret out protectionist regulation under equal protection or due process 
scrutiny,'0 such an inquiry could still play a role through the takings 
analysis. 
2. The Regulation Distributes Benefits Broadly to the Public 
Government compensation for land-use regulation typically is paid 
from taxpayer funds. A justification for such imposition on taxpayers 
is that the regulation benefits the taxpayers. Regulations that tinker with 
the contractual relationship between discrete groups of persons, such as 
between employer and worker in a particular industry or as between a 
discrete number of adjoining landowners,91 provide a poor fit for 
imposing the burdens of compensation. For many economic regulations, 
government intervention to benefit one class is diminished by counter-
vailing market forces: An increase in the mandatory minimum wage, for 
example, is likely to result in the employers' decreasing whatever 
benefits the workers receive. Because of the ongoing contractual 
relationship between parties to coromerce, the regulated party is able to 
compensate itself for the increased costs of regulation.9 For land-use 
regulations, on the other hand, there typically may be no ongoing 
contractual relationship that the landowner can alter to compensate itself 
for the money lost due to the regulation. 
Most significantly, the match between those paying for compensation 
and those benefitting from the regulation presents the most potent case 
for exploiting the political benefits of a system of compensation, which 
is discussed at length in Part rv. 
3. The Landowner Appears "Innocent," As Explained Herein 
The third element is somewhat more complex, but it need not be so 
complicated that it swallows the Article's analysis or stalls identification 
90. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
91. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
92. As noted above, many such economic regulations have their most significant 
effect not in redistributing income as much as in redistributing the timing of income, the 
source of income, and its separation into saving and investment 
224 
[VOL. 34: 193, 1997] "Takings" Compensation 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
of the quintessential best case. Indeed, a case that fits the first two 
elements is more likely to fit within the third, and vice versa. 
There can be a variety of methods of reaching a conclusion that a 
landowner is "innocent."93 The chief methods offered here are the 
"unequal treatment'' argument and the "happenstance" argument, as 
outlined in Part II. As explained in Part II, land-use regulation is more 
likely to raise concerns of unequal treatment of otherwise similar 
landowners because of the unique attributes of land. When government 
acts in an ad hoc manner to prohibit a particular land use at a particular 
site, the arguments of unequal treatment and innocence are strongest. By 
contrast, when government broadly regulates an entire industry, such as 
through business regulation, the unequal treatment and innocence 
arguments are weakest.94 
Consider an example of an unequal treatment argument for innocence. 
A town re-zones ten tracts of land to permit housing construction. The 
value of the land soars, and the tracts are sold to developers for a dear 
price. . Eight developments have been completed when the town finds 
that it has underestimated the town's sewage use; it re-zones the two 
remaining tracts for non-housing use, with a concomitant plummet in the 
value of these two tracts. Here is a relatively strong case for landowner 
"innocence." By contrast, consider a case in which all housing 
developers are required to include as part of new projects a certain 
93. One possible means of defining uinnocence" would be to include certain fixed 
categories of land or landowners that arouse our sympathies or implicate the value of 
personal autonomy. Land that is a home or a family farm could be presumed to be 
"innocent" There is strength to such a classification. I hesitate to suggest it, however, 
for fear that a "homestead standard" would be used as an "out'' for wealthy and not-
innocent landowners, just as state bankruptcy homestead exemption laws eviscerate, in 
many instances, much of the purpose of bankruptcy. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 12. 
94. It is a difficult thing to argue, in this area of scientific and dispassionate legal 
studies, that some governmental or legal rules are based predominantly on moral 
criticism of the regulated conduct while others are based predominantly on questions of 
expediency. With the bankruptcy of ideas of natural law, religious-based law, or neutral 
legal principles, arguments of economic efficiency, incentives, and procedure are 
triumphant In the accident-law question discussed in the last section, the shifts from 
a nineteenth cennuy system of"reasonable9 ' conduct to Hand's mathematical fonnula to 
the idea of strict liability shows a distrust of rules of compensatory justice based on 
distinctions of right and wrong. Yet, in the field of land use, it is still possible and 
useful to attempt to employ a morally loaded tenn such as "innocence," as long as it is 
accepted that the term is employed mostly as a short-hand tool for identifying our 
quintessential best case and not as a full-blown assessment of morality. 
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percentage of low-cost housing. Although both housing development 
examples involve the public good, and the latter example might over the 
long run cost a big developer more than the loss of a single tract in the 
first example, the quintessential model posits that only the first example 
provides an argument of unequal treatment and thus "innocence," and 
accordingly provides a stronger argument for compensation. 
The "happenstance" argument is that the landowner could not have 
reasonably anticipated the need for the regulation or done anything to 
stop the need from arising. It was just bad luck.95 Consider the 
following fantastic hypothetical.96 Imagine if the dodo, whose extinc-
tion from the Indian Ocean isle of Mauritius by 1681 awakened Western 
man to his destructive power over nature, turned out not to be extinct 
after all. A small colony, which no doubt learned the lesson of 
proximity of man, has survived in a remote comer of Madagascar for a 
few hundred years. Soon after being discovered by American scientists, 
however, all the dodos die of disease except for one ailing but pregnant 
female. Plans are made to transfer her to an American veterinary center, 
in hopes that cloning can be accomplished and that the dodo can then be 
reintroduced to a preserve set aside in Mauritius. En route to the 
veterinary center, however, the dodo escapes and nests in the work site 
of a half-constructed home in a suburban neighborhood. Once located, 
the nesting dodo exhibits signs that lead wary scientists to conclude that 
the mother should be permitted to carry to term and tend to her newly 
hatched chicks without excessive disturbance. They calculate that three 
years will be necessary for the young dodos to achieve the stability 
necessary for removal. Following public sentiment, the local govern-
ment revokes the building permit for the prospective homeowner, much 
to her chagrin. She demands compensation for the "taking" of her 
property, even though she is still permitted to enter the lot and use it. 
Just having mortgaged the property, she is faced ,vith a significant out-
of-pocket loss. 
95. Real examples of seemingly innocent landowners do not all arise from the 
post-New Deal era. Consider Hadacheck v. Sebastien, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). There, a 
Los Angeles land ordinance prohibited the plaintiff from continuing operation of his 
brickmaking business, despite the fact that other brickmakers were permitted to remain 
in business and the fact that the plaintiff began brickmaking on the quarry spot before 
the city expanded to reach him. The plaintiff offered evidence that it was financially 
infeasible to cart clay away from the quarry to another brickmaking location. He 
asserted a property value diminution from $800,000 to $60,000, which was uncompensat-
ed. The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance. 
96. If the hypothetical seems fantastical, it is no more so than the 11dying violinist" 
hypothetical that has proven to generate so much interest in the abortion debate. See 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PIIlL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49, 55-59 
(1971). 
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Here is a good case for "innocence." True, the prohibited land use 
would interfere with a valid public interest-protecting the dodo. Under 
a test that focussed primarily on the strength of the public interest, the 
case might not trigger compensation. Under the quintessential best case, 
however, there are a number of factors that argue in favor of "inno-
cence."97 Most notably, the landowner appears "innocent" because her 
desired land use would have been perfectly acceptable in almost any 
other circumstance, time, and place. The fact that our landowner is 
required to pay the costs of dodo protection is merely a "happenstance," 
and one that is both unusual and unpredictable. 
What sorts of land-use regulations are unlikely to involve an 
"innocent'' landowner? The answer includes regulations based on 
traditional common-law nuisance--both private nuisance, which affects 
one or a few landowners, and public nuisance, which affects a large 
number of persons98-and other regulations that concern the intercon-
nection of land use. When regulations are adopted because of broad-
reaching ecological concerns, such as prohibiting chemicals from seeping 
into ground-water, or because of obvious concerns that would spark the 
attention of any reasonably aware landowner, such as the proximity to 
the shoreline in Lucas, these concerns erode the landowner's argument 
of "innocence." The incentive argument turos against compensation; by 
declining compensation in such instances, we encourage landowners to 
engage in the useful collection of information as to the interconnections 
between their land and other property interests. 
In sum, although it may be impossible to anticipate every persuasive 
argument of landowner "innocence," the unequal treatment and 
97. Again, it is noteworthy that this regulation probably would not ruo afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Because of the government's interest 
in preserving the dodo and the necessity of doing so by restricting this landowner's use 
of her property, it is rational for the government to have prohibited building on this 
property and only this property. This case shows the significant distinction between the 
equal protection test, which scrutinizes the worth of the regulation, and the unequal 
treatment element of the taking analysis, which scrutinizes only whether compensation 
is warranted. 
98. Can the public benefit of the sort described in the dodo example or in the 
zoning example fit within the definition of nuisance? The answer would be "yes" if 
nuisance were defined broadly to mean any use of land that government found to be 
contrary to the public interest Under such a definition, however, almost any rational 
government regulation could be defined as involving nuisance, and the number of 
compensations for takings would fall to near zero. 
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happenstance arguments will form a substantial proportion of persuasive 
"innocence'' arguments. 
IY. JUSTIFYING THE QUINTESSENTIAL BEST CASE AND SOME 
BENEFITS OF APPLYING THIS STANDARD IN DEVELOPING A TAKINGS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The quintessential best case is justified further by identifying some of 
the obvious drawbacks of providing compensation for regulation and 
showing that these drawbacks generally are avoided in a compensation 
system that is guided by the quintessential best case standard. Like,vise, 
the Article then identifies some of the obvious advantages of a system 
of compensation and shows that these advantages would likely be 
captured by a program that followed the best case model. 
Government's Refereeing of Competing Land Uses. When government 
regulation merely chooses between two incompatible land uses, the 
argument for com~ensation typically is weakest. The classic case is 
Miller v. Schoene, 9 in which the government regulation appeared to 
merely referee between two potentially competing land uses. Depending 
on the rule of law, either the cedar tree owners would be permitted to 
maintain their trees, with the accompanying detriment to nearby apple 
trees, or the apple tree owners would triumph by a rule that required 
cedar trees to be cut down. As with any governmental decision defining 
one party's property rights vis-a-vis another's, the government was not 
faced with a choice between "neutral" inaction and partisan action; even 
government inaction in such a case would be, in the court's famous 
words, ''none the less a choice."100 
The quintessential best case avoids situations involving governmental 
choices between competing land disputes. By requiring that the benefits 
99. 276 U.S. 272 {1928). 
100. Under the Coase Theorem, government plays a role in establishing the extent 
of property rights-the ground rules-so that the parties can then bargain to achieve the 
most efficient outcome. See supra note 48. In addition, the governmental choices in a 
Cease free-bargaining world also resolve the question-often significant from a social 
welfare perspective, if not an economic efficiency one-of who ends up richer and who 
ends up poorer. 
To be complete, it is possible to imagine instances in which putative governmental 
"refereeing" so contradicts traditional assumptions of competing property rights that the 
adversely affected landowner might have a relatively strong case for compensation. 
Consider a regulation that "redefined" property rights to grant to each landowner the 
property right to aa undiminished amount of light emanating through a neighbor's 
property-in other words, a law with the effect of prohibiting virtually any new 
construction because of new construction's effect on the newly redefined "property 
rights" of neighbors. Such a broad regulation would fit both the second and third 
elements, but not the first element, of the quintessential best case. 
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of the regulation be conferred broadly across the relevant community, 
the quintessential best case avoids governmental refereeing of land 
disputes among discrete sets of the community, as in Miller v. Schoene. 
Because only the apple tree owners were direct beneficiaries of the law, 
there is a weak.er argument for imposing the costs incurred by the cedar 
tree owners on the community at large. 
Moreover, by requiring that landowners prove their "inno-
cence"-defined in this Article as proving, most typically, that they are 
being treated differently from similarly situated landowners or that their 
predicament was necessitated by happenstance-the quintessential best 
case avoids regulations that are the expression of broad ecological 
concerns. 
Consider, for example, the forthcoming federal ban on many uses of 
methyl bromide, the chemical that plumps strawberries and other fruits 
growing in the patch. Strict regulation is being imposed in order to 
avoid damage to the ozone layer supposedly caused by the chemical. 101 
While the concerns about methyl bromide are not the type that are likely 
to win a nuisance action in tort, the chemical's supposed effects plainly 
involve the interconnection of land uses. By affecting all methyl 
bromide users equally, the regulation will enable those who are directly 
regulated-fruit farmers-to pass on some of their increased costs to the 
consumer through higher prices and smaller strawberries. Because of the 
equality of treatment of affected farmers, these farmers would not be 
able to show a good case for "innocence." The methyl bromide 
regulation, as with other regulations that reflect broad ecological 
concerns, thus is not a good candidate for the quintessential best case. 
The High Costs of Compensation. Another obvious objection to 
providing compensation to adversely affected landowners is the fiscal 
burden on the government. It would cost a huge amount of money to 
reimburse every landowner for every diminution of property values by 
virtue of government regulation. As Holmes pointed out in Pennsylva-
nia Coal, 102 nearly everything government does in some way affects 
some private citizen's wealth. Moreover, government does not recoup 
IOI. See 40 C.F.R. pl 82, subpL A, app. A, F (1996) (listing methyl bromide as a 
Class I ozone depleting substance); 40 C.F.R. § 82.4 (general prohibition on Class I 
ozone-depleting substances); see also Jeff Wheelwright, The Berry and the Poison, 
SMITHSONIAN, Dec. 1996, at 40, 43. 
I 02. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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from favorably affected citizens when it confers a benefit upon these 
property owners, such as by constructing a dam to enable irrigation, 
adding more police to a crime-plagued area, or zoning a neighborhood 
to increase property values of current residents. Just as government does 
not seek to charge everyone for all the benefits it confers, the argument 
goes, it cannot reimburse everyone for all the costs it imposes. 
The quintessential best case model plainly fits with this concern. By 
limiting the best case to those instances in which a landowner can make 
out a case for "innocence," the burden of compensation is necessarily 
constricted. Moreover, in narrowly distributed benefit cases such as 
Miller v. Schoene, there is a poor fit between the direct beneficiaries of 
the regulation and the taxpaying public. Accordingly, the quintessential 
best case includes only broadly distributed benefit regulations, not cases 
such as Miller v. Schoene. 
As may be seen by now, the quintessential best case often resembles 
what might be called a "pure public welfare" regulation. The advisabili-
ty of compensating landowners adversely affected by such pure public 
welfare regulations was the point o~ the dissenters in the Penn Central 
historic preservation case.10 If the regulation is supposed to benefit 
everyone in the community and only one party bears the costs of the 
regulation, and that landowner is "innocent" in that it cannot be blamed 
for holding the air rights of an historic building it itself constructed, the 
argument goes, is this not the strongest possible case for compensa-
tion?'°' 
Because the quintessential best case for compensation fits with "pure 
public welfare" regulations, does this mean that the analysis views public 
interests as being less important than private interests?105 It does not. 
As explained in Part II, the relative importance of a regulation should 
not, by itself, form a barrier to the decision to . compensate. The 
importance of even the most urgent government construction projects 
does not relieve the government from the burden of compensating for 
eminent domain seizures; indeed, the more crucial the government 
action, the less worrisome the fiscal burdens of compensation appear. 
103. Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
104. As noted in Part I, other factors argued against compensation in Penn Central, 
most notably that Penn Central did not lose any investment-backed expect1tions, because 
it built the train tenninal a half~centuiy before it conceived of the plan to exploit the air 
rights. 
105. A criticism of Lucas is that, by limiting the government's defenses only to 
those defenses that a private landowner would have under traditional nuisance law, the 
court ignored the value of the public interest in things such as restricting growth and 
preserving undeveloped shorelines-values that traditionally cannot form the basis of a 
nuisance action. 
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Consider a less traditional example of pure public welfarer-the idea 
of "deep ecology," which argues that there is value in nature for its own 
sake, or in and of itself, not simply because certain attributes of nature 
serve the desires of humans.106 The Endangered Species Act, 107 for 
example, is an instance of government regulation motivated arguably in 
part by deep ecology. Because deep-ecology regulations appear to 
confer benefits broadly (although not to individual humans but to the 
breadth that is nature) and because some regulations may impose costs 
narrowly on only a few landowners, who may make out a good case for 
"innocence" (if they reasonably did not expect to find, say, endangered 
beetles burrowing in the ground where they planned to build), deep 
ecology regulations may often fit well with the quintessential best case. 
This does not mean, however, that deep ecology is considered any less 
important than private concerns, such as the property interests of the 
apple growers in Miller v. Schoene. The question of compensation, this 
Article stresses, is not about determining the relative value of a 
governmental regulation. Rather, the question is how to allocate the 
undisputable financial costs of the regulation. Thus, a conclusion that 
government should compensate adversely affected landowners for certain 
deep-ecology regulations is not a conclusion about the value of the 
regulation, just as it is not in the context of eminent domain seizures. 
Indeed, as explained later in this section, this Article argues that a 
system of compensation for deep ecology regulations might result in 
better and more effective governmental regulations protecting environ-
mental and ecological interests. 
Having shown that the quintessential best case avoids covering some 
of the types ofregulations for which compensation is the least justified, 
the argument now moves to showing that the quintessential best case 
encompasses some of the advantages of a system of compensation. 
Taxation is as "Progressive" as Regulation. If one of the goals of 
regulation is to place the costs on the "winners" of society who can 
afford a slight diminution of their wealth, imposing these costs through 
taxation may be as "progressive" as imposing them through uncompen-
sated regulation. Because of the graduated levels of current federal 
taxation, wealthy taxpayers pay far in excess of the share that would be 
allocated under a per capita tax. Unlike commercial businesses, wealthy 
106. See, e.g., SHABECOFF, supra note 46, at 124. 
107. 16 u.s.c. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
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citizens cannot pass along government taxation through higher prices. 
Because consumption of goods and services naturally is not skewed 
toward the wealthy as much as income is, burdens imposed on consump-
tion are not as "progressive" as burdens imposed through income 
taxation.108 Compensation in accordance with the quintessential best 
case would capture these advantages by shifting the costs of a broad-
benefit, innocent-landowner regulation from the relatively innocent 
landowners to the progressive taxation system, with its inherent 
advantages. 
Encouraging better governmental land-use rules. Another theoretical 
advantage of compensation captured by the quintessential best case is the 
encouragement of better governmental decisions concerning property use. 
This encouragement can be felt in a number of ways. 
First, compensation that follows the quintessential best case provides 
an impetus to worthwhile initiatives with diffuse benefits but concentrat-
ed costs. Legislation analysts theorize that government proposals that 
distribute benefits broadly but in small amounts, and which impose 
burdens heavily on one or a few parties, face special obstacles to 
adoption, even if they would result in net benefit to society. Because 
each favorably affected individual holds only a tiny interest in the 
outcome, these individuals have no incentive to organize support, pay 
transaction costs, and press the government for adoption. On the other 
side, the one or few parties that would bear the concentrated burden 
have the incentive to pay the costs of pressing against adoption. 109 
This effect may distort government decisions to an unusual extent in 
land-use decisions, many of which benefit the entire community, but the 
costs of which typically are borne by only a few landowners. 110 • 
108. The countervailing political problem with taxation, as discussed below, is 
Americans' inherent dislike of taxation, even when the alternative may cost them more, 
109. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public 
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 325 (1988). The 
political difficulties of environmental regulation may also be attributed at least in part 
to this effect. The converse effect may also be true, as witnessed by various subsidies 
and tax breaks won for well•organized business interests at the expense of the taxpayer, 
each of whom is affected too little for the taxpayer to do anything about it. 
1 IO. For an example, consider a land use proposal that would benefit each member 
of a community of l 0,000 with 10 "benes1" except for three adversely affected 
landowners, who stand to lose 1000 benes each by diminution of property value. The 
costs of organizing for each citizen is 15 benes, while the few lando,1,11ers can organize 
and create a strong lobbying network for 100 benes apiece. No community group arises 
to support the proposal, while the landowning coalition mounts an effective legislative 
campaign and defeats the proposal. Under a system of compensation, the disbursed-
benefit, concentrated-cost dilemma can be circumvented. By compensating the three 
landowners for their diminution, which costs 3000 benes (3 X I 000 benes) to the 
government, the public gains 100,000 benes (10,000 x IO benes). 
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When the burdens ofland-use regulations are imposed on groups such 
as wealthy and active homeowners, the chances of regulation by local 
government becomes very slim. Consider zoning laws that effectively 
prohibit construction of low-rent apartment buildings across huge 
stretches of urban and suburban areas, despite the dire need for such 
housing among less-affluent urban dwellers. As a result of this zoning, 
encouraged by suburban homeowners, the poor are often crowded into 
a few pockets of apartments, often far from suburban jobs. Such zoning 
affirmatively prevents the market from providing adequate, affordable, 
and convenient housing for working citizens. 
The notable failures of efforts to place public housing uoits in middle-
class areas is a testament to the zeal of metropolitan homeowners in 
using government to their advantage, at the expense of the poor, racial, 
and immigrant minorities.111 By providing compensation to some 
adversely affected landowners, this zeal might be diminished, and the 
market would be permitted to respond to the housing needs of the entire 
community.112 
Second, compensation in accordance with the quintessential best case 
could enable government to distinguish more readily between good and 
poor regulatory options. Consider a town faced with two regulatory 
choices for its land-use goal. The first choice, regulating a large, well-
connected business, would provide the town with an estimated 600,000 
benes, and would cost the landowner $300,000 in diminution of the 
value of its property. The other choice, regulating a smaller business 
owned by a recent immigrant, would provide 300,000 benes, and cost 
111. See, e.g .. United States v. City of Yonkers, 29 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994) (decades 
of litigation and millions of dollars spent in a battle to shift some public housing to more 
middle-class areas in one New York suburb). 
112. Working out the details of a system of limited compensation for restrictions 
such as zoning would be complicated and are beyond the scope of this paper. Some 
thoughts may be mentioned, however: For each apartment building placed in a formerly 
all single-family-home neighborhood, residents within one block could be compensated 
for diminished value of their property. Such a system would provide compensation to 
those homeowners who would be directly affected by the diminished suburban vista, 
increased noise, and increased garbage from the apartment building. Excluded from 
compensation would be more distant neighbors, whose opposition appears less likely to 
be land-based and more likely to reflect a dislike of the sort of people who wish to move 
into their community. The closer-in homeowners have a valid complaint to government; 
the ones further away do not Such a system of compensation might well facilitate 
expanded housing opportunities and decrease rents for poorer Americans and might 
further expose some of the more odious effects of single-family housing zoning. 
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the landowner $200,000 in diminution. Under a system of regulation 
without compensation, the land-use decision is likely to become a matter 
of intense political interest and, sometimes, of intrigue. Lawyers and 
lobbyists will be dispatched, deals will be made, and public support will 
be attracted through publicity about the potential job loss that will occur 
if the first choice is adopted. If the well-connected landowner's 
attorneys are worth their money, they will work hard to defeat the first 
choice, even though this is the choice that best benefits the public. One 
of the problems in attracting support for this first choice is that the 
public, not galvanized by a lobbying effort, may be unaware of the level 
of benefit. With compensation, however, the process changes. The 
well-connected business may still lobby against the regulation, but its 
vigor will be diminished at the prospect of compensation. With the 
pressure of the political battles lessened, the town council is more likely 
to decide on the choice most beneficial for the town. Assuming that the 
"benes" were converted one for one to dollars, and compensation 
provided, the first choice (which provides 600,000 - 300,000 = 300,000 
benes) is a better deal than the second choice (which provides 300,000 -
200,000 = 100,000 benes), and will be adopted by the council. Indeed, 
by eliminating the role of politicking, the town is better off financially, 
because it reaps 300,000 benes under a compensation plan, while it had 
to settle for 100,000 benes under the pure regulatory plan, skewed by 
back-room politics. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify or "prove" the extensive-
ness of the role of lobbying and politics in shaping land-use regulation. 
The extent of such influence will of course determine the extent to 
which a scheme of compensation will improve land-use decisions. With 
an understanding of profit maximization's central role in making 
lobbying decisions, and the historical and philosophical testaments to the 
reach of lobbying in ske,ving the political process, 113 one is tempted 
to assign a fairly prominent role for such efforts in any government 
attempts to coerce private actors.114 
113. For a vignette of the lobbying process in one area of the national legislative 
process, see JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN s. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 
(1987). For a more philosophical treatment, see Buchanan's public choice writings. 
BUCHANAN & TuLLOCK, supra note 31. 
114. Compensation can encourage better Iand•use decisions even without the 
lobbying factor. Consider anew two competing proposals: the first will generate 800 
benes and cost $600 to the landowner, and the second will give 700 benes but cost only 
$ 100. Viewed purely on the facial benefits, the first choice would seem preferable for 
a government deciding under a regulatory model. What may not be apparent to the 
government at first analysis, however, is that the costs to the landowner may reverberate 
back to the public through layoffs, the resultant necessity of public assistance, higher 
prices, and the other means that corporations have of shifting along increased costs of 
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This discussion is simply another way of stating the economic 
argument that once both costs and benefits are internalized to the 
decisionmaker, the decision that is chosen may differ from that chosen 
if only one side of the balance is considered. The purpose here has been 
to point out that, because of the nature of government 
decisionmaking-influenced as it is either by lobbying or by lack of 
information as to long-term costs--a system of compensation instead of 
fiat may enable government to make better decisions about the real costs 
and benefits to the public. 115 
Third, the public debate that may be stimulated over whether to 
impose regulations that would trigger compensation under the quintes-
sential best case fits well with the advantages of direct democracy. 
There are strong arguments in favor of retaining representative fovem-
ment, as opposed to direct democracy, for many issues." The 
argument for direct democracy is strongest, however, when the 
governmental question is a simple choice between an undisputed public 
good and the cost of paying for it Because the choice is stark and 
plain--Are you willing to pay for better public schools?--such pure 
public benefit questions are as accessible as the every-day decision 
whether to purchase consumer goods. 117 In the political system, such 
enterprise. Much of the $600 in cost may end up being borne by the government or by 
the citizenry through other avenues. The second choice, it turns out, may be the least 
costly one for the public. 
115. Of course it is obvious that these numbers will not favor compensation in every 
instance; one can play with them to work out instances in which regulation without 
compensation creates greater benefit to the pub1ic, as common sense would intuit The 
point has been to show that in some instances, particularly those instances in which 
lobbying efforts work counter to the public interest, a system of compensation will result 
in better land.use regulatory decisions-decisions that provide greater public benefit. 
I I 6. Representative government-ftS opposed to direct democracy-remains 
desirable in the age of instantaneous electronic information, for the simple reason that 
many citizens of the electorate are not infonned, prepared, or inclined to give reasoned 
analyses of the intricacies of many policy issues and are susceptible to whims that the 
intentionally slow machinery of government is not. One is reminded of the odd 
comment of General Jack D. Ripper in Stanley's Kubrick's film Doctor Strange/ave as 
to why he violated the constitutional imperative of civilian control of the military: "War 
is too important to be left to politicians. They have neither the time, the training, nor 
the inclination for strategic thought" DOCTOR STRANGELOVE (Columbia Pictures 1963). 
Unless one is willing to accept instantaneous democratic computer voting on all 
important issues of governmen4 one agrees with the idea of representative government 
to some extent. 
117. Unquestioned "public goods" are defined as those choices by which everyone 
in the community is as well or better off, except for the question of cost. Making 
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choices are made available to the public through bond referenda. 118 
These referenda on whether government will pay for the unquestioned 
goods avoid the dilemma that citizens appear to oppose higher truces but 
demand greater benefits. Referenda do not lump plans and projects 
together; they present the citizen with a stark choice: Do you want it or 
not? Under this system, the citizen knows specifically to what use the 
money will be put and the citizen understands precisely the costs of the 
project. Accordingly, unlike with taxes, citizens are more likely to 
approve costly referenda than they are to approve of a politician who 
voted for the project but who also voted to increase truces. Indeed, 
because many eminent domain land-use projects-new schools, new road 
paving,119 etc.-fit within the unquestioned good model, they are often 
posed to the public and paid for by bond referenda. 
The referendum model holds great promise for land-use regulation, 
much of which fits well within the definition of an unquestioned "public 
good" when accompanied by compensation. Consider a town which 
would like to re-zone its popular wholesale grocery market out of its 
smelly and cramped location in the old center of town to a more 
spacious spot that is also closer to modem highways and more conve-
nient for most shoppers. 110 The wholesale merchants acquiesce to 
move their operations. The only complaint comes from the owner of the 
land under the central market, who complains that the high-rent land, 
zoned for the market years ago and for which it paid dearly, will drop 
in value. Instead of a political battle over re-zoning, the government 
could pose the question by referenda: Are you willing to help pay for 
compensation to the downtown landowner in order to facilitate the 
unquestioned good of moving the central market?121 
everyone within a community as well or better off is a "Pareto superior'' choice, in 
economic parlance. Referenda are not appropriate for questions not involving plain 
choices of whether to pay for unquestioned public goods. Questions in which there is 
a "losef'-including wealth transfer questions, most economic regulations, and foreign 
affairs -should all be decided by the republican political process. 
118. One potential criticism of bond referenda is that, by compelling citizens to 
choose between only two outcomes, the referenda are too inflexible and may not truly 
reflect community desires. In this regard, however, bond referenda are not any worse 
than the election of political candidates through our democratic republican form of 
government. 
119. Until a few decades ago, most would have agreed that "new roads" were an 
unquestioned public good. 
120. Paris, France, did this in the 1960s to its formerly famous central market, Les 
Hailes. 
121. Encouraging greater public involvement in property-use regulatory decisions 
might also help ferret out purely protectionist regulations, such as the infamous law in 
the "oleomargarine case," Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1988). Because of the 
scarcity of land, regulations that restrict land use are especially susceptible to profiting 
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Fostering the publics consciousness of environmental and ecological 
protection. A final advantage captured by structuring compensation 
around the quintessential best case is the potential for developing public 
awareness of land regulatory issues, particularly in the realms of 
environmentalism and ecology. 
Starting with the early "conservationists" of the nineteenth century, the 
United States has given the world the concept of a national "park" as a 
large-scale nature preserve122 and has progressed through the late 
twentieth century "environmentalist'' movement, which has resulted in 
sophisticated laws designed to limit pollution and ecological degradation. 
The land-use protection movement can count many triumphs. 123 Yet 
the concept of land-use protection remains on the fringes of the 
American psyche, still thought of by many as the idea of meddling 
government bureaucrats or, even worse, fairly comical tree-buggers 
whose idea of value has no relation to their own. 
Legally, the gains and hopes of environmentalists teeter in the breeze. 
The national elections of 1994 appeared to signal a coming apocalypse; 
the stalemate victories of 1995 and 1996 appeared either to be the result 
of deeper natural awareness among the populace than was expected or, 
more likely, the result of a shrewd campaign by environmentalists 
against forces that did not have an anti-environmental mandate at the top 
of their agenda. 124 
those parties who remain unrestricted. When land-use regulatory decisions are subjected 
to the public spotlight through public participation in governmental decisions, however, 
it is more likely that protectionist regulations, masked as public health, safety, or welfare 
measures, will be revealed. 
122. Yellowstone National Park was created in 1872; in 1864 President Lincoln had 
approved the transfer of Yosemite valley to the California government, essentially for 
preservation purposes. The term "park" fit with pre-1872 century ideals of a nature 
"park"----tamed, organized, and prepared for strolling. Many were not yet ready to 
accept the idea of a "preserve" for nature, including its untamed, unproductive, and 
potentially dangerous features. 
123. See generally SHABECOFF, supra note 46. 
124. One of the telling tum-abouts in 1995 was the scornful media reporting ofa 
supposed Republican attempt to "close national parks," which actually was focused more 
on Park Service "units11 such as Pennsylvania's pork-barrel "Steamtown" than on any of 
the wilderness parks. See, e.g., John H. Adams, Hansen's Real Record on Public Land 
Issues, SALT LAKE TR!B., Mar. 8, 1996, at A27 (discussing Representative Jim Hansen's 
sponsorship of H.R. 260). Some environmental activists have a history of twisting the 
facts to gamer public support, something they have in common with the rest of their 
lobbying brethren. See, e.g., RUSSEU. MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM 
(l 989) ( explaining the effective if not-always truthful campaigns of the Sierra Club, 
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The yawning gap between those who accept the fundamental aims of 
the environmental movement and those who do not are often underesti-
mated by those within the movement. In 1949, when Aldo Leopold was 
trying to awake mid-century consciousness, it was plain to him that 
"[t]here are some who live without wild things, and some who can-
not."125 Today, with environmentalism having reached "critical mass" 
in many areas, too many appear content to look down with incomprehen-
sion on those who do not share their viewpoint. The assumption too 
often is that failure of support for laws that protect the land are the result 
of transitory greed or foolish misunderstandings.126 Both of these 
factors may be present, but many environmentalists ignore Leopold's 
perspicaci1y and fall back on narrow Thoreauvian declamations of "we 
need nature," without recognizing the depth of belief, or at least breadth 
of feeling, on the other side. 127 
The sad truth is that many, if not most, Americans retain a traditional 
lack of interest in things natural or, at best, have acquired a shallow 
understanding. While environmental advocates like to trumpet 
tendentious polls that show overwhelming support for protecting the 
environment, any true strength of ideals, much less Leopold's call for 
acceptance of a "land ethic," remain far from the front of many 
American's minds. It is difficult to find rigorous support for this 
observation, because it is not productive for pollsters to test the depth of 
understanding. One semi-scientific, semi-anecdotal study is deeply 
instructive, however-Bill McKibben's book, The Age of Missing 
Information. 128 In comparing a day in which he lived in close proxim-
ity with nature in New York's Adirondacks, McKibben watched every 
among others, to stop dam-building in the West). 
125. ALDO LEOPOLD, Forward to A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC xvii (1949). 
126. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams,At the Fusion of Horizons: Incommensurability and 
the Public Interest, 20 VT. L. REv. 625, 643 (1996). 
127. Surrounding a 1996 article entitled "What Good Aie Animals?" is a quotation 
from Herny Beston: 
We need another and wise and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals. In 
world older and more complex than ours they move finished and complete, gifted 
with extensions of the sense we have lost or never attained, living by voices we 
shall never hear. They are not brethren, they are not underlings; they are other 
nations, caught with ourselves in the net of time and life, fellow prisoners of the 
splendour and travail of the earth. 
NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Spring 1996, at 32 (quoting HENRY BESTON, THE OUTERMOST 
HOUSE 25 (1926)). Compare then the comment of Fran Lebowitz a few pages later: 
I do not like animals. Of any sort. I don't even like the idea of animals. Animals 
are no friends of mine. They are not welcome in my house. They occupy no space 
in my heart. Animals are off my list. 
Id. at 35. To which conception do most Americans lean? Aie there so many Fran 
Lebowitzes out there that true environmentalism remains impossible? 
128. BILL MCKIBBEN, THE AGE OF MISSING INFORMATION (1992). 
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hour of television presented during that same day in the suburban 
Virginia county of Fairfax--home of the nation's most extensive cable 
system at the time, as well as being America's most affluent county. 
From more than 1000 hours of viewing productions of news, play-acting, 
documentaries, and advertisements that Americans presumably demand 
through a vigorous market, the experiment revealed a shattering, utter 
paucity of interest or attention in things natural or environmental. Hours 
upon multitudes of hours of entertainment, murder report after murder 
report, presentation of products to buy and buy, but nothing of substance 
about the environment. Indeed, McKibben concludes that not only has 
materialism era contributed to our lack of understanding of nature, but 
the television era has helped to snuff out lingering interest in our 
physical environment. 129 The economist and lawyer might emphasize 
that because so many potential natural sources of pleasure are not 
property--mockingbirds, sunsets, rockweed--no one has the economic 
incentive to market the pleasures inherent therein. While not being 
property saves these things from commercialization, it also causes them 
to evaporate from the consciousness of Americans reared and sustained 
on television and markets.130 Even for those not necessarily suscepti-
ble to the culture of commerce, few Americans seem to subscribe to 
what entomologist E.O. Wilson calls "biophilia," a sense of caring for 
living things of all types.'31 Rather, many appear to share to some 
extent Fran Lebowitz's comment, if not her bluntness, that "[a]nimals 
... occupy no space in [her] heart."132 How many hold a similar lack 
of interest in things even less appealing than puppies--such as rocks, the 
idea of wilderness, appropriately oxygenated streams, or ozone-stable 
atmospheres? 
The most important goal of the environmental movement in the 
twenty-first century will be not to win isolated battles over particular 
plots of land or to adopt newer protective legislation, but to engender 
public awareness, understanding, and respect for the natural environment, 
so that the battles will not be so hard to win and, once won, will remain 
won. 
129. Id. at 10-36. 
130. Here's an experiment for those born within the television era: Try to identify 
as many birds as you can in nearby trees or fields. Then ask or re-create how many 
your parents or grand-parents, even those with less education, can or could have named. 
131. EDMUND 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 2 (1984). 
132. NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, supra note 127, at 35. 
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What does this have to do with compensating landowners adversely 
affected by land use regulations? The answer is that schemes of 
compensation, while costly to the short-term bottom lines of government, 
can play a crucial, perhaps even essential, role in the continuing 
education and awareness of the public regarding environmental issues. 
As the science of natural systems continues to become more complex, 
the environmental movement risks losing both public understanding and 
public support for their goals. Just as important as public support is 
public comprehension--it is one thing to root for nature against big 
business, it is another to comprehend the difficult questions about the 
relationship between humans and nature. Continued loss of crucial 
habitats, dangers from the increase in the numbers of certain ,vild 
animals, threats to the environment by the relentless march of 
suburbanization, and threats to the standard of living posed by some 
tough environmental choices-these are issues from which the natural 
world is bound to suffer unless the public understands the consequences 
of its choices. It is more than just ensuring that the public does not 
view environmental protection as "elitist." By keeping environmental 
issues in the mainstream, the gap between advocacy and public opinion 
should not widen too far. 
It is said that the lost battle to save Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy Valley 
in 1913 was a galvanizing moment for the protection of wilderness for 
its own sake; the destruction of New York's Penn Station in 1964 played 
a similar role in sparking the historic preservation movement. 133 What 
may be needed in the twenty-first century are little Hetch Hetchys and 
Penn Stations throughout American towns and governments-not the 
loss of unique spaces of land, but local issues that direct and focus 
public attention. Instead of considering a fiat regulation to protect wild 
space or an historic building, presenting the populace with questions of 
whether the regulation is worth the compensation can help build the 
needed understanding. True, penny-pinching, civic reluctance, and 
public opposition may doom some useful land-use regulations from 
being adopted if compensation is required. But by lowering the fear 
among landowners that their land might contain some wetland or 
protected structure that might cause them monetary loss, landowners 
might start to respect their land more, not only out of threat of 
government intervention, but because of a dawning of knowledge that 
was not there before. And more significantly, the choices raised by 
compensation may, in random case after random case, pull the public's 
attention towards understanding how the watershed is abused, under-
133. See supra note 50. 
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standing the interaction of shopping malls there and loss of songbirds 
here, and understanding the disappearance of historical heritage. 
The Western mind has been criticized in some quarters for its 
disrespect for the land and its desire to enforce dominion over it. 134 
Some look longingly to the stable and static cultures that live within the 
environment, do not seek self-progress, and do not accumulate written 
knowledge. 135 But turning back is hardly an option for the bulk of 
Westerners now; rather, we should employ the enormous capability of 
the Western mind to understand complexity, impart knowledge, and 
create solutions. To quote E.O. Wilson somewhat out of context, "[T]he 
same knowledge that brought the dilemma to its climax contains the 
solution."136 If a limited system of compensation, in accordance with 
the quintessential best case model, helps engage public awareness, it will 
be a happy union and it will have been worth every penny. 
V. APPLYING THE QUINTESSENTIAL BEST CASE FOR COMPENSATION 
TO SOME EXAMPLES OF LAND-USE REGULATION 
To conclude, this part provides some concrete examples of applying 
the quintessential best case to regulations that should be accompanied by 
compensation. As noted at the outset, it is not the purpose here to draw 
the line between cases when compensation should be provided and those 
when it should not. Depending on one's view of factors such as the 
need for government to act unfettered, the difficulties of figuring 
compensation, the economic incentives generated by the ability to recoup 
all the profits from land ownership, and the political factors outlined in 
this Article, the line one draws may shift from one end to the other. 
Rather, the purpose is to provide a mechanism for distinguishing the 
better cases from the poorer ones. 
The examples discussed briefly here are those of historic preservation 
regulation, zoning changes, anti-growth regulations, shoreline regula-
tions, logging restrictions, wetlands protections, and work safety laws. 
As the examples continue, the case for compensation becomes weaker. 
134. See, e.g., MARsl!ALL, supra note 14; Genesis 1:28 (Douay 1953) ("Increase 
and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue i~ and rule over the fishes of the sea, and 
the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth."). 
135. See generally BARRY LoPEZ, ARCTIC DREAMS (1986). 
136. WILSON, supra note 131, at 13. 
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A. Historic Building Preservation Regulation 
Depending on one's values, one may view preservation of historic 
structures as being of paramount importance for government or merely 
a pleasant outcome. In any event, historic preservation regulations 
present a relatively strong case for compensation, under the quintessen-
tial case. First, these regulations apply, abnost by definition, only to a 
limited, discrete number of landowners. m There is a strong aspect of 
unequal treatment of landowners for reasons having nothing to do with 
the inherent nature of their conduct--<:ertain landowners are restricted 
from demolishing or destroying the buildings, while neighboring 
building owners are not so restricted. Only fairly arbitrary government 
decisions distinguish one building from another. Designation can 
diminish value for reasons having nothing to do ,vith the conduct of the 
landowner. 
Second, such regulations provide benefits broadly to the public. No 
particular class of persons is provided special status. While devotees of 
historic buildings, and those persons who may live or work near the 
building, will be the ones to enjoy the building with the direct senses, 
this categorization is no greater than with any regulation restricting use 
of particular, discrete plots of land. Taste presumably cuts across levels 
of community. The political factors posited above favoring compensa-
tion apply with full force here. The beneficiaries roughly match the 
taxpayers who will have to pay for compensation, compensation may 
facilitate the ability to distinguish effective choices from less effective 
ones, and the involvement of the public may lead to better public 
awareness of, appreciation of, and acceptance of historic preservation 
programs. Moreover, the arguments for better property definitions and 
benefits of government ownership are especially strong here. Govern-
ment purchase of property rights could be effected by buying easements 
against destruction or defacement of the property. Such purchases would 
have the benefit of permanence and would provide government with a 
solid legal position to take action against a landowner who acted in 
violation of the easement. 
Finally, owners of historic buildings seem fairly "innocent." While 
some buildings obviously seem historic, designation may be difficult to 
anticipateY8 If they were, such anticipation would undermine the 
137. Exceptions would be cases such as designations of entire historic districts, such 
as New Orleans's Vieux Carre. 
138. When first built, few buildings seem plainly destined for historic status; by 
definition, they acquire historic patina over time. 
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purposes of the historic preservation by discouraging ownership of 
historic building and encouraging defacement, destruction, or other 
action ahead of time to avoid historic designation in the future. As it is, 
current preservation law is stung by instances of!andowners fleeing from 
preservation or status or working to diminish their property's attractive-
ness to avoid designation. 139 Unlike ecological regulation, historic 
preservation does not implicate the interconnection of land or any 
traditional property rights of others. The interest of the public in seeing 
and appreciating historic buildings seems as close as one can come to 
"pure public welfare" regulation having little to do with the conduct or 
responsibility of the landowner. In the potential instances in which 
designation would enhance the value of property-because of the newly 
attached "status" of the buildin~f course no compensation would be 
necessary.140 In sum, historic preservation, while fraught with logistic 
difficulties in determining the level of compensation and what sort of 
interest the government would purchase, presents one of the strongest 
cases for compensation under the quiotessential model. 
B. Zoning Changes 
Depending on the situation, zoning changes may affect only one or a 
large number of parties. When few are affected, such as zoning "down" 
of a property planned for commercial construction, this is a prime 
example of the sense of unequal treatment; one shopping developer may 
be permitted to complete his project, but the next one, having expected 
similar success, is stopped because of an ad hoc conclusion that one 
shopping center is enough. The conduct of the two developers seems 
nearly indistinguishable. The prospect for large out-of-pocket loss also 
seems likely in zoning cases. Unlike in the historic preservation 
example, however, zoning decisions may be more susceptible to 
anticipation. But as noted in Part IV, zoning is a noteworthy example 
of private interest's ability to use government's coercive power to serve 
139. See, e.g., Editorial, Born Yesterday: Historic Preservation Ordinance Could 
Backfire, HOUSTON Ci!RON., Mar. I, 1995, at A20; Linda McCarthy, Saga of Old House 
Ends; It Wasn't Historic at All, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 12, 1993, at D-2. 
I 40. The tricky part would be to detennine the change in value attributable to 
designation. Unlike other land use restrictions, which presumably could only lower 
property values by taking away at least one of the "bundle of rights," the potential 
appeal of holding historic status complicates the matter. 
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unsavory private profit interests, such as the zoning out of lower-income 
housing. 
Second, zoning changes typically serve the interests oflocal residents 
broadly, at least the neighborhood surrounding the zoned parcel. The 
beneficiaries of regulation roughly match the potential payers of 
compensation. The political factors for compensation speak strongly 
here, especially when the affected landowners are politically powerful 
groups such as homeowners associations, whose political power may 
enable them to block the zoning changes without compensation. When 
government appears unable to adopt a desired land-use change because 
of political opposition, this is the best case for government itself to 
consider compensation in order to facilitate adoption. As also noted in 
Part IV, zoning offers the potential for interesting compensation plans to 
limit such political power, such as through persuading adversely affected 
homeowners in discrete areas to accept changes "up" in nearby zoning. 
The possibility of discouraging ''flight" from ethnically changing areas 
and encouraging social stability is one of the more interesting potential 
benefits of a system of land-use regulatory compensation. 
Finally, landowners adversely affected by zoning changes appear to be 
mostly "innocent," in that zoning rules are clear-cut; for certain periods 
of time, landowners expect the ability to build, and to enjoy restrictions 
on a neighbor's ability to build, in accordance with the zoning plan. For 
the beneficiaries of zoning changes---the landowner whose property is 
zoned "down" beneficially, or the neighbors who benefit by nearby 
zoning ''up"--the benefits seem to resemble not traditionally expected 
property rights, but simply political victories. On the other hand, 
because of the significance of big development plans to communities, 
challenges to development have come to be expected by developers, \vith 
the appropriate risk presumably factored into land prices. In sum, while 
zoning provides a mixed analysis, some instances fit within the 
quintessential model. 
C. Local Anti-Growth Regulations 
Regulations restricting population growth in a community by 
restricting housing construction can be especially distressing-in essence, 
they place on neighboring communities all the burdens of an increasing 
national population. Typically the preserve of wealthy and politically 
organized communities, anti-growth regulations increase the costs of 
housing above what they would be on the market. They also smack of 
anti-democracy, in that older, established persons hold the ability to 
exclude from their community those younger than themselves, the 
immigrants, and others who wish to take part in whatever joys are 
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offered by the particular community. Treatment is unequal, being based 
simply on the idea of ''first in time." Unlike other regulations of 
undesirable activity, restricting a town's population growth will do 
nothing to discourage the development of the factor underlying the 
desire for the regulation-the national problem of increased population 
growth. 
That having been said, anti-growth laws are not always good 
candidates for the quintessential case for compensation. Potential 
residents who may be restricted from moving in would be hard--if not 
impossible-to identify, would be large in number, and would be 
entitled to an especially amorphous amount of compensation. When 
anti-growth regulations adversely affect developers who have expecta-
tions, on the other hand, the case resembles the zoning change analysis. 
For the benefit factor, there is a good fit between beneficiaries of the 
anti-growth laws and the current residents, and the burden of any 
compensation would fall just as widely. Potential residents are 
"innocent" in that they simply wish to enjoy what the existing residents 
already enjoy. Finally, while such regulations may implicate the 
interconnectedness of land--new housing causes congestion, dirtier air, 
etc.--these are not traditional rights of property owners, and the 
restrictions are applied without balance, with one group receiving 
beneficial treatment simply by virtue of having got to the town first. 
D. Shoreline Development Restrictions 
Regulations of developments on coastal areas share many attributes 
with zoning regulations and anti-growth regulation in certain circum-
stances. In other cases, where ecology is the impetus, there is little in 
common, and the case for compensation becomes much weaker. 
Shore regulations will typically affect only a few landowners, but they 
will probably be unable to make out an unequal protection argument if 
all similarly situated landowners are equally affected. If other landown-
ers are "grandfathered" the first factor analysis resembles that of the 
anti-growth laws. The direction of the benefit factor depends on the 
impetus for the regulation. If adopted in order to provide, say, public 
access to beaches, then the beneficiaries of the regulation roughly 
resemble the taxpaying community. If, by contrast, the purpose is 
ecological or economic--such as limits on docks near salt marshes to 
minimize potential harm to local fisheries or to prevent erosion of nearby 
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land-then the beneficiaries of the regulation are a different class from 
the taxpaying community. 
A similar analysis applies for the "innocence" factor. If adopted for 
reasons of protecting others' land, then the regulation prevents a 
nuisance, or at least something akin to a nuisance. The regulated 
landowner is less "innocent'' in that his actions, by their inherent nature, 
affect others' interests. Such effects also can be anticipated by potential 
developers. In sum, environmentally based shore building restrictions 
make a fairly poor case for compensation. 
E. Logging Restrictions 
Again, the nature of the regulation determines whether there is any 
chance of fitting the quintessential case. If the regulation applies 
broadly to an entire class of similarly situated landowners-such as with, 
say, a regulation against felling trees ,vithin 100 feet of any stream or 
creek in order to prevent erosion or to protect stream life, the case for 
compensation is weak. Such a regulation would apply to a large number 
oflandowners and would not implicate equal protection concerns. The 
landowner is not "innocent" in that his actions inherently affect the 
riverine interest that the regulation is designed to protect; it implicates 
interconnection of land through a simple ecological effect that should be 
expected by a wise landowner. 
By contrast, if the regulation is narrowly applied-say, prohibiting the 
cutting of a certain staud of old growth trees, the fit with the quintessen• 
tial case may be stronger. In such a case, the adversely affected 
landowners may have grounds to complain of unequal treatment if 
similar stands of old growth trees are not regulated. The landowners 
might not be wholly "innocent" if they could have anticipated the 
regulation, but again, the disparate treatment of their stands from others 
like them strengthens the argument that there is nothing inherently 
problematic with cutting these sorts of stands; the decision to regulate 
only their stand shows signs of ad hoc decisionmaking. On the other 
hand, if there is an ecological basis for the regulation, such as through, 
say, the unique community of woodpeckers that thrive in this old-growth 
stand, regulation protects a public property interest in the maintenance 
of the woodpecker community. 
When regulation is supported by "deep ecology" concerns of nature 
for nature's sake, it is difficult to describe a fit between taxpayers and 
the benefit, but the "community" aspect of deep ecology argues for a 
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good fit. 141 Finally, this is a fine example of the potential inherent in 
a compensation referendum to develop economic awareness. When 
presented with the choice of preserving a stand of trees that existed 
before the founding of America and a taxpayer-share of a few dollars to 
pitch in for compensating the landowner, not only may environmentalism 
find quite a few new friends, but the ecological lesson that the referen-
dum might generate would pay dividends for years to come. 
F. Wetland Protections 
Regulations that apply sweepingly across the landowning 
community, such as restrictions on unpermitted filling of wetlands, 
provide a poor fit with the quintessential model. There is little room to 
argue unequal treatment. Arguments of "happenstance" weaken as 
public awareness of wetlands issues spreads over time. While the 
benefits may be spread broadly in some instances, the reach of the 
regulation and the small effect on each landowner makes the political 
benefits of compensation exceptionally costly and unwieldy to employ. 
To the extent that wetlands are protected to protect property interests 
such as the public's "title" to migratory birds or neighboring landowners' 
interest in maintaining the water table, this sort of regulation implicates 
complex questions of the interconnection of land. In sum, it makes a 
poor case for compensation under the quintessential model. 
G. Work Safety Regulations 
If applied to all similarly situated employers, such a non-land-use 
regulation distributes costs broadly and makes a poor case for unequal 
treatment. The beneficiaries of the regulation are not the taxpayers but 
the workers who enjoy the safety protections; the political and other 
arguments in favor of imposing costs on the electorate do not apply. 
Because it does not restrict use of land per se, it does not implicate the 
scarcity concerns inherent in land-use regulations. Because of the on-
going contractual relationship, employers may be able to recoup some 
of the money spent on work-safety standards by holding back on wages. 
141. Critics of' deep ecology would disagree mightily aod would argue that such 
measures simply provide benefits to environmentalists at the expense of others. 
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In general, as should be understood by now, non-land-use economic 
regulations form the weakest case for compensation under the quintes-
sential best case for compensation. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The line between land-use regulations that require compensation and 
those that do not may be impossible to draw with any precision or any 
rigor. This Article hopes to aid the "takings" analysis by making some 
discrete points. First, the hybrid nature of the right to compensation for 
takings makes the analysis of this right different from other constitution-
al rights; because compensation still enables government to carry out the 
regulation, there is less need to balance the merits of the regulation in 
order to decide whether the affected landowner deserves compensation, 
Next, the focus of the takings analysis should turn to questions of 
unequal treatment, "innocence" of the landowner, and whether the 
regulation would benefit those citizens who would have to pay for 
compensation. Advocates of protection for land and the environment 
need not always fear compensation; under the quintessential best case for 
compensation presented here, narrowly targeted regulations such as 
historic preservation and certain zoning changes are the restrictions that 
fit the model best. Even if a wider system of compensation were 
imposed on land-use regulations, this need not spell doom for environ-
mental protection. Indeed, the potential for shifting land-use decisions 
away from the strong-arm world of politics and into the light of public 
opinion might, in time, lead to greater public awareness and understand-
ing of environmental issues, which can only improve the chances for 
effective natural resource protection. 
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